The Philippines’ Next President May Have to Reckon With Millions Who Belong to Neither Duterte, Marcos or the LP

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For decades, Philippine presidential elections have been contests among familiar political families, their allies, and the shifting coalitions that sustain them. Political parties change names, politicians change allegiances, and yesterday’s bitter enemies become tomorrow’s electoral partners. What rarely changes is the concentration of political power among a relatively small circle of personalities.

The 2028 presidential election may confront this political arrangement with an increasingly important question: What happens when millions of Filipinos identify with none of the country’s dominant political factions?

An emerging body of survey research suggests that these politically unaligned Filipinos constitute a substantial segment of the electorate. They are neither necessarily supporters of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. nor loyalists of the Duterte political family. Neither should they automatically be classified as supporters of the established opposition.

They are the Filipino independents. And their political significance deserves far greater attention than the usual presidential popularity surveys provide.

In a landmark study published in June 2026, political scientists Dean Dulay and Cleve V. Arguelles identified four principal categories of political identification among Filipino voters: Duterte supporters, comprising 37.8 percent; opposition supporters, 26.4 percent; Marcos supporters, 14.5 percent; and those identifying with none of these factions, 21.2 percent (Dulay and Arguelles 2026).

The findings challenge a familiar assumption about Philippine politics: that nearly every voter belongs, at least emotionally, to one of the country’s competing political camps.

But the researchers discovered something equally important. Philippine political divisions are shaped less by coherent economic ideologies than by regional identities, social attitudes and personalistic political loyalties.

This is the enduring weakness of Philippine party politics. Political identification often follows personalities rather than principles, while electoral alliances frequently substitute for durable political institutions.

Millions outside the political camps

The Commission on Elections projects approximately 74 million registered voters for the 2028 national elections (GMA News 2026).

Applying Dulay and Arguelles’ 21.2 percent estimate to that projected electorate produces approximately 15.7 million politically unaligned voters. Broader definitions of independence used in other surveys could produce considerably larger estimates, potentially reaching the 18 million to 30 million range.

These estimates are not interchangeable. They reflect different definitions, populations and survey methods. Nor should the estimated number of independents be confused with the number of undecided voters.

Nevertheless, their scale raises an important political question: in a presidential system where the candidate with the most votes wins, even without an absolute majority, the distribution of votes among politically unaligned citizens can matter enormously.

Consider the 2022 presidential election, in which Ferdinand Marcos Jr. received more than 31 million votes and Leni Robredo received approximately 15 million. The Marcos-Duterte alliance demonstrated how consolidating political networks could translate into a commanding electoral majority.

But the dissolution of that alliance has exposed the fragility of coalitions built primarily around political personalities.

The question for 2028 is whether voters who identify with neither of the principal factions represent temporary dissatisfaction with established politicians or something more enduring: a constituency seeking political representation beyond traditional political families.

Independence does not mean neutrality

There is, however, a serious analytical danger in treating independent voters as though they constituted a single political community.

They do not.

An independent voter may reject identification with the Duterte faction while nevertheless preferring Sara Duterte for president. Another may decline to identify with the traditional opposition but still support Leni Robredo. Still another may favor a candidate based on economic policy, personal reputation, or perceived governing performance.

The August 2026 National Momentum Survey illustrates this complexity. It reported Sara Duterte receiving 45.8 percent support in a hypothetical presidential contest, followed by Robredo at 19.5 percent and Sen. Raffy Tulfo at 13.3 percent (Momentum Research 2026).

Meanwhile, an October 2026 survey of a hypothetical contest between Robredo and Davao City Mayor Sebastian Duterte found that 51.6 percent of self-identified independents preferred Robredo, compared with 34.8 percent for Sebastian Duterte (Momentum Research 2026).

These findings cannot be treated as forecasts. The candidate lineups differ, and the election remains more than a year away. But they illustrate an essential distinction: political independence is not necessarily electoral indecision.

This distinction matters because the significance of independent voters lies not in their presumed unity but in the possibility that their preferences may cross established factional boundaries.

The corruption question

The ongoing controversy over alleged irregularities in government flood-control projects adds another dimension to the 2028 political landscape.

The scandal has raised questions about public procurement, infrastructure spending, political accountability and the capacity of Philippine institutions to investigate powerful public officials.

A Pulse Asia survey conducted in December 2025 found that confidence in the punishment of officials responsible for flood-control irregularities had declined. The proportion of respondents who believed that responsible officials would be punished fell from 71 percent in September to 59 percent in December. Only 44 percent expressed confidence in the justice system’s ability to prosecute high-level corruption cases (Pulse Asia 2025).

More recently, an October 2026 Pulse Asia survey identified inflation as an urgent national concern for 71 percent of respondents, while 39 percent cited fighting graft and corruption (Pulse Asia 2026).

These figures suggest that corruption and economic insecurity are important elements of the political environment. But public concern about corruption does not necessarily translate into support for any particular political faction.

A Duterte supporter, a Marcos supporter and an independent may all condemn corruption while disagreeing about responsibility, institutional credibility and the political consequences.

The challenge for any political movement claiming to represent a third force is therefore not simply to express public anger. It is to demonstrate that it represents something politically and institutionally distinct.

The possibility of a third force

The phrase “third force” has appeared repeatedly in Philippine political discourse, usually during periods of dissatisfaction with established political elites.

Yet a third force is not necessarily a political party. It may be a coalition of personalities, a temporary electoral alliance, a civic movement or an organization built around a coherent governing program.

The distinction is consequential.

A movement assembled around dissatisfaction with existing political leaders may disappear once those leaders leave office. A political party organized around enduring principles, democratic membership and institutional accountability can potentially survive changes in leadership.

Dulay and Arguelles’ findings illuminate the challenge. They show that Filipino voters often share similar economic preferences despite identifying with different political factions. Many also describe themselves as political centrists (Dulay and Arguelles 2026).

Thus, the absence of factional identification does not automatically establish the presence of a distinct ideological constituency.

The existence of millions of independents provides evidence of political nonalignment. It does not prove that those voters want a new party, agree on a common program or would support the same presidential candidate.

That remains an unanswered empirical question.

The problem with personality politics

The deeper issue concerns the structure of Philippine democracy.

Political scientist Nathan Quimpo has described the Philippines’ electoral order in terms of elite domination and the limitations of its democratic institutions (Quimpo 2008). Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora likewise examined how weak political parties, patronage networks and entrenched elites constrain democratic development (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003).

These institutional problems help explain why political competition so frequently revolves around personalities rather than competing visions of government.

A new political organization could reproduce precisely the same problems if it merely assembled prominent personalities under a different political label.

Indeed, calling a movement independent does not make it institutionally independent. Nor does describing a candidate as a reformer establish that the candidate is committed to meaningful reform.

The relevant tests are organizational and institutional: transparent financing, accountable leadership, internal democracy, consistent policy commitments and independence from personal patronage networks.

Such standards should apply equally to established political parties and organizations claiming to represent a third force.

Two possible elections in 2028

The configuration of the 2028 presidential contest remains uncertain.

One scenario involves Sara Duterte seeking the presidency against candidates associated with the established opposition and other political groupings.

Another involves her absence from the ballot, potentially with Sebastian Duterte or another Duterte-associated politician participating instead.

These scenarios matter because factional identification and personal candidate preference are not identical.

The presence or absence of a particular candidate could alter the choices available to independents without necessarily changing their underlying political identities.

Whether such changes would benefit a third-force candidate cannot be established from existing surveys.

What can be established is that the politically unaligned electorate deserves to be studied separately from undecided voters and supporters of the principal political factions.

That distinction is indispensable to understanding the changing Philippine electorate.

Beyond Marcos and Duterte

The broader significance of independent voters extends beyond the immediate presidential contest.

The Philippines has repeatedly experienced changes in political leadership without corresponding transformations in the institutions through which political power is organized.

Presidents depart, coalitions dissolve, and new alliances emerge. Yet weak parties, political dynasties and patronage-based relationships remain prominent features of the political system.

The independent electorate raises the possibility of examining whether this pattern is changing.

Are more Filipinos evaluating candidates independently of factional loyalties? Are citizens increasingly interested in political organizations based on policy commitments rather than family identities? Or does apparent independence simply reflect dissatisfaction with the current choices?

The answers require more than conventional presidential preference polling. They require longitudinal surveys measuring political identification, institutional trust, policy priorities and willingness to participate in political parties over time.

The 2028 election will provide an important opportunity to examine these questions.

But the political importance of independents should not be measured solely by whether they support a particular presidential candidate.

Their greater significance may lie in what their existence reveals about the limits of the country’s traditional political alignments.

The Philippines does not lack political parties. It lacks sufficiently institutionalized parties capable of providing durable alternatives to personality-centered competition.

Millions of politically unaligned Filipinos do not automatically constitute a new political force. They do, however, raise a question that the country’s political establishment can no longer afford to ignore:

Must Philippine democracy remain an endless contest among competing political families, or can political representation eventually become organized around institutions, principles and accountable government?

The answer will not be determined by the number of people calling themselves independent.

It will be determined by whether Philippine political institutions can offer those citizens meaningful representation beyond the personalities that have long dominated the country’s elections.

And that question will remain important long after the votes of 2028 have been counted.

References:

Dulay, Dean, and Cleve V. Arguelles. 2026. “The Contemporary Filipino Voter: Factionalism, Demographics, and Vote Choice.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034261455054.

GMA News. 2026. “Comelec: 74M Voters Expected in 2028 Polls.” September.

Hutchcroft, Paul D., and Joel Rocamora. 2003. “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 3 (2): 259–292.

Momentum Research. 2026. “2 in 5 Filipinos Would Vote for Sara Duterte in 2028 Presidential Race.” August National Momentum Survey.

Momentum Research. 2026. National Momentum Survey, hypothetical Robredo–Sebastian Duterte presidential matchup, reported October.

Pulse Asia. 2025. Ulat ng Bayan National Survey. December 12–15.

Pulse Asia. 2026. Ulat ng Bayan National Survey. October findings on urgent national concerns.

Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. 2008. Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.


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Richard EM Riverahttp://www.currentph.com
Richard E. M. Rivera is a scholar-practitioner specializing in international relations, governance, and strategic communication. He is completing his degree in International Studies at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, and holds a post-graduate diploma in General Management from the Asian Institute of Management. He currently serves as Managing Partner and Senior Advisor at Rebel Manila Marketing Services, a public relations agency focused on crisis management, reputation strategy, and government relations. Previously, he was Vice President at FleishmanHillard, advising global and regional clients on strategic communication and issues management. A Certified Public Relations Crisis Advisor and Certified Paralegal, Mr. Rivera also co-convenes Artikulo Onse, a broad civic coalition advocating transparency, accountability, and the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust.

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