Philippine politics has developed a curious paradox. Just as the Duterte family’s once-commanding electoral position appears vulnerable, one of its most recognizable political rivals has decided she wants no part of the coming presidential contest.

The latest evidence comes from OCTA Research.

In a survey reported Tuesday by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a hypothetical presidential and vice-presidential ticket featuring Naga City Mayor Leni Robredo and Sen. Raffy Tulfo registered 43 percent support, compared with 39 percent for Davao City Mayor Sebastian Duterte and Sen. Robin Padilla.

Another 18 percent of respondents chose neither tandem nor remained undecided.

The survey, conducted September 28 to October 4 among 1,200 Filipino adults, carries a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points. OCTA itself cautions that the four-point difference is slight, that neither tandem commands majority support, and that this first measurement cannot establish a trend.

The results are politically significant not because they establish who would win in 2028, but because they challenge the assumption that a Duterte-backed presidential ticket would necessarily dominate any contest involving the traditional opposition.

And the picture becomes more complicated when another OCTA finding is taken into account.

In a separate hypothetical presidential matchup against Robredo, Vice President Sara Duterte’s preference rating declined from 46 percent in the first quarter of 2026 to 40 percent in the third quarter. Robredo’s rating also slipped, from 35 to 33 percent, but the gap between them narrowed from 11 to seven percentage points.

The proportion of respondents who were undecided, selected neither candidate, or did not know increased from 19 to 26 percent. This is hardly evidence of an electoral stampede toward Robredo. Her numbers have not materially improved.

What has changed is the distribution of preferences. Duterte’s measured support has softened, while the uncommitted share has grown.

For a political family whose national appeal has long been associated with strong personal loyalty, that is a development worth examining.

Is impeachment beginning to affect the Duterte brand?

The ongoing impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte provides one possible explanation for the changing political atmosphere.

The proceedings have brought renewed attention to allegations concerning public funds, financial accountability and unexplained wealth. The accusations remain contested, and the trial has not established guilt.

Yet an impeachment proceeding has political consequences independent of its eventual legal judgment.

The Duterte family’s appeal has historically drawn partly on its anti-establishment rhetoric, its emphasis on political decisiveness and its claims to represent an alternative to conventional political elites.

Financial allegations, if sustained by credible evidence, would present an obvious challenge to the family’s anti-corruption narrative.

But there is an important distinction between political plausibility and empirical proof.

The OCTA surveys do not establish that impeachment caused the decline in Sara Duterte’s preference rating. Other explanations remain possible: shifting political alliances, changing economic concerns, dissatisfaction with established political personalities, or a broader reconsideration of electoral choices.

Indeed, the latest tandem survey was conducted before Robredo’s November 9 declaration and measures preferences concerning Sebastian Duterte rather than Sara.

These distinctions matter. A preference shift involving one member of a political family cannot automatically be treated as evidence of an identical shift involving another.

Nevertheless, the two surveys raise a common question: Is the Duterte family’s electoral appeal becoming more conditional than it once appeared?

The answer will require additional polling, particularly surveys measuring perceptions of the impeachment evidence, institutional trust and the reasons respondents are changing their political preferences.

The electoral geography tells a deeper story

The national figures conceal sharply contrasting regional and linguistic constituencies.

OCTA found Robredo–Tulfo registering 61 percent in Balance Luzon against 19 percent for Duterte–Padilla, and 49 percent against 32 percent in Metro Manila.

Mindanao presents almost the reverse picture: Duterte–Padilla received 81 percent, compared with just 4 percent for Robredo–Tulfo.

In the Visayas, the figures were much closer, at 43 percent for Duterte–Padilla and 41 percent for Robredo–Tulfo.

The ethnolinguistic differences are equally striking. Robredo–Tulfo recorded 54 percent among Tagalog/Filipino respondents and 80 percent among Ilocano respondents, while Duterte–Padilla registered 75 percent among Cebuano/Bisaya respondents.

These differences overlap with regional patterns, so they should not be interpreted as evidence that language alone determines political preference.

Socioeconomic class presents another important finding.

Among Class D respondents, who account for roughly four-fifths of the adult population in OCTA’s classification, both hypothetical tandems registered 41 percent.

That finding complicates the familiar notion that Philippine elections can be understood simply as contests between reform-oriented middle-class voters and populist candidates appealing to the poor.

Geography, language, local political networks and individual candidate reputations appear relevant to the composition of these hypothetical coalitions.

The survey also reveals differences by age. Robredo–Tulfo respondents were disproportionately older, while Duterte–Padilla drew a greater share of younger respondents.

These patterns illustrate the challenges any future coalition would face in constructing a national electoral constituency.

But they do not establish that either hypothetical ticket has a durable advantage. Electoral preferences can change substantially once actual candidates, running mates and campaign issues become known.

Why is Robredo refusing to run when the surveys continue to include her?

Perhaps the most consequential political news this week was not the OCTA survey itself, but Robredo’s response to renewed speculation about her presidential ambitions.

On November 9, the Naga mayor categorically ruled out another national candidacy.

She said her decision had been made before she sought the Naga mayoralty in 2025. She had not returned to local government merely to wait for another opportunity to seek higher office.

Her explanation was unusually revealing.

Robredo acknowledged that she believes she can perform the administrative responsibilities of national leadership but considers herself insufficiently skilled at navigating the political relationships and negotiations required at that level.

She also emphasized that local government allows her to concentrate more directly on public service.

Her statements suggest three possible interpretations.

The first is straightforward: Robredo genuinely prefers local governance. After serving as vice president and enduring a demanding presidential campaign, she may regard the Naga mayoralty as a more suitable setting for her approach to public administration.

The second concerns the distinction between administrative responsibility and political coalition-building. A Philippine president must manage Congress, local political networks, competing political interests and relationships within the executive branch. Robredo’s own statements acknowledge that these demands differ substantially from managing a city government.

The third involves the experience of 2022. That election demonstrated the difference between generating extraordinary volunteer enthusiasm and assembling a nationwide electoral coalition. Whether that experience influenced her present decision is unknown, but it remains relevant to understanding the organizational challenges that would accompany another national candidacy.

None of these explanations requires assuming that Robredo is secretly negotiating for a presidential nomination.

Indeed, her repeated statements point in the opposite direction.

Would another political party change her mind?

The possibility of Robredo joining a new political coalition raises an intriguing question, particularly if the coalition were independent of the Liberal Party and the established Marcos and Duterte political camps.

A new party might offer a different organizational structure, a broader range of political allies and a governing program not defined primarily by the rivalries of previous elections.

But there is currently no verified evidence that such an arrangement would persuade Robredo to reconsider.

Her refusal has not been limited to running under a particular party. She has ruled out national office altogether.

It is therefore more useful to distinguish two separate possibilities: Robredo becoming a candidate under another party, and Robredo supporting a candidate nominated by another party.

The first would require her to reverse an unequivocal public position.

The second is consistent with what she has already said.

On November 9, Robredo expressed willingness to support a capable and deserving national candidate. She also mentioned several possible national leaders, including Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte, Pasig Mayor Vico Sotto, Sen. Risa Hontiveros, Sen. Francis Pangilinan and Sen. Bam Aquino.

Her willingness to support someone else opens a different set of political possibilities.

Rather than becoming the presidential candidate of a new coalition, Robredo could participate in national politics through endorsements, policy advocacy, and cooperation among reform-oriented political groups.

Whether she would choose to do so, and under what circumstances, remains uncertain.

What happens to Raffy Tulfo?

The OCTA findings also raise questions about Tulfo’s political position.

The hypothetical Robredo–Tulfo combination is interesting because the two politicians have developed public reputations through different kinds of political activity.

Robredo is closely associated with governance reform, civil society involvement and institutional accountability.

Tulfo’s public reputation developed through broadcasting, handling consumer complaints, and intervening in disputes involving ordinary citizens before his election to the Senate.

A hypothetical partnership therefore brings together distinct political identities.

But the survey does not establish how much of the tandem’s support comes from Robredo, how much comes from Tulfo or how many respondents favor the combination rather than either individual.

Nor does it establish that Tulfo would accept a vice-presidential nomination.

If Robredo remains outside national electoral politics, the assumptions underlying the tandem survey would no longer apply. A different presidential partner could produce a different distribution of preferences.

Tulfo’s own political decisions would consequently become an important variable in the emerging 2028 electoral landscape.

The uncommitted electorate may be the most important finding

There is another number in the OCTA survey that deserves greater attention than the four-point difference between the two tandems.

Eighteen percent of respondents remained uncommitted.

In the separate Sara Duterte–Robredo presidential matchup, the uncommitted share reached 26 percent, excluding the 1 percent who refused to answer.

These are not identical groups, because the surveys presented different hypothetical choices. Nor should all uncommitted respondents be classified as political independents.

Some may have preferred other candidates. Others may have been genuinely undecided or dissatisfied with the alternatives presented.

Nevertheless, these findings suggest that a substantial portion of the electorate has not committed to the personalities in these matchups.

This raises a question that reaches beyond Robredo and the Dutertes.

Could the 2028 election provide an opening for a political formation whose identity is not organized primarily around allegiance to, or opposition against, an established political family?

Such a possibility would depend on the emergence of actual candidates, party organizations, credible governing programs and electoral coalitions. The OCTA survey alone cannot answer it.

What it does show is that the political preferences of a significant number of Filipinos remain unsettled.

The significance of Robredo’s withdrawal

There is an irony in the latest political developments.

OCTA has produced a hypothetical tandem survey in which Robredo figures prominently, only for Robredo to reiterate that she has no intention of becoming a candidate.

That contradiction demonstrates one of the limitations of early presidential polling.

Surveys can measure the appeal of hypothetical political arrangements, but they cannot compel politicians to participate in them.

The 43 percent registered by Robredo–Tulfo is a measurement of public preference under a particular survey question. It is not an electoral asset that can simply be transferred to another opposition ticket.

Likewise, the 39 percent recorded by Duterte–Padilla cannot be taken as the full potential electoral strength of the Duterte family, particularly if Sara Duterte eventually becomes a candidate.

The impeachment proceedings introduce another layer of uncertainty. Their outcome could affect political alliances, candidate eligibility and public perceptions of the vice president. But the current polling does not establish how these developments will translate into votes.

Robredo’s decision may therefore matter less as a personal political mystery than as an institutional challenge for the opposition.

Can political groups develop durable organizations, coherent policy platforms and credible national leadership without depending on the continued availability of one familiar candidate?

And can voters evaluate competing political programs independently of the personalities associated with them?

These questions will remain relevant regardless of whether Robredo ever changes her mind.

The real test of 2028

The latest OCTA survey should not be read as a declaration that the Duterte political dynasty is approaching electoral defeat. Neither should it be dismissed as a meaningless hypothetical exercise.

It documents a particular moment in Philippine public opinion: a competitive tandem matchup, sharply differentiated regional constituencies, substantial uncommitted shares and an electorate whose preferences remain open to change.

Combined with the narrowing Sara Duterte–Robredo presidential preference gap, the results raise legitimate questions about the durability of established political loyalties.

But they also reveal the limits of the available evidence.

It is too early to conclude that impeachment is responsible for the softening of Sara Duterte’s preference ratings. It is equally premature to assume that Robredo’s continued appearance in surveys will eventually persuade her to seek national office.

The most revealing development may be that Philippine politics is beginning to confront a future in which the most familiar personalities are not necessarily the candidates who eventually appear on the ballot.

Robredo may remain in Naga. Tulfo may pursue his own political plans. Sara Duterte’s legal and political circumstances may change. Sebastian Duterte may or may not seek the presidency.

And the voters who currently decline to choose among these hypothetical alternatives will eventually confront a different, concrete set of choices.

The central question of 2028 is therefore not simply whether a Robredo–Tulfo tandem could challenge a Duterte–Padilla ticket. It is whether Philippine political parties can build meaningful electoral alternatives when the personalities around whom those alternatives have been imagined decline to participate.

That may be the more enduring political consequence of Robredo’s decision.