China’s ambassador to the Philippines has accomplished in a few sentences what years of Chinese public diplomacy have struggled to prevent: He has reinforced the perception that Beijing regards its smaller neighbors not as sovereign equals, but as countries expected to accommodate its growing military and economic power.

Ambassador Jing Quan’s recent declaration that China could easily prevail in a military confrontation with the Philippines was more than a diplomatic indiscretion. It exposed a fundamental contradiction in Beijing’s foreign policy: China wants the international community to recognize it as a responsible major power, yet some of its diplomats continue to employ the intimidating rhetoric associated with its controversial wolf warrior diplomacy.

On October 15, responding to Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr.’s characterization of China as a regional troublemaker, Jing told reporters: “If we want to use force, we may easily win.” He subsequently emphasized that China preferred peace and would not choose force.

But that qualification did little to diminish the message.

For a country already confronting Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea, an ambassador’s public reference to military superiority can hardly be dismissed as an innocent observation.

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs described Jing’s remarks as provocative and unacceptable. Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro summoned the ambassador on October 19 to convey Manila’s formal objection. Beijing defended its representative, arguing that his statement had been selectively quoted and misinterpreted.

The controversy raises a question that reaches far beyond Manila: How can China persuade smaller countries that its rise is peaceful when its own diplomatic representatives remind them how easily Beijing could defeat them militarily?

 Xi Jinping’s diplomatic contradiction

For more than two decades, Chinese leaders have sought to reassure the world that China’s emergence as a major economic and military power does not necessarily threaten the sovereignty or security of other states.

Under Hu Jintao, Beijing advanced the language of peaceful development and harmonious international relations. Under Xi Jinping, these ideas have been incorporated into the more ambitious vision of building a community with a shared future for humanity.

At the December 2023 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, China’s leadership reaffirmed its commitment to peaceful coexistence, international cooperation and opposition to hegemonism.

China has repeatedly maintained that countries, whether large or small, should enjoy sovereign equality.

Yet Jing’s remarks raise an uncomfortable question: If Beijing genuinely subscribes to sovereign equality, why would its ambassador consider China’s ability to defeat a smaller country an appropriate argument in a diplomatic disagreement?

The contradiction becomes clearer when examined through the concept of soft power.

Joseph Nye (2004) distinguishes soft power, which rests on attraction and persuasion, from coercive power, which relies on military and economic capabilities. A country may possess overwhelming military strength without necessarily enjoying international legitimacy or political influence.

David Shambaugh (2013), in China Goes Global: The Partial Power, similarly observes that China’s expanding economic and strategic capabilities have not been matched by equivalent levels of international attraction and political influence.

This remains one of Beijing’s greatest diplomatic challenges.

China wants the world to acknowledge its strength. But it also wants other countries to regard that strength as beneficial rather than threatening.

Jing’s statement undermines the second objective while accomplishing little more than restating the first.

The return of China’s wolf warriors

Jing’s remarks also resemble a confrontational diplomatic style widely known as wolf warrior diplomacy.

This approach, associated with increasingly assertive Chinese diplomatic communication during the Xi Jinping era, involves aggressive public rebuttals, denunciations of foreign critics and uncompromising defenses of Beijing’s policies.

Peter Martin (2021), in China’s Civilian Army, traces the institutional foundations of Chinese diplomatic behavior to the Communist Party’s historical expectations of political loyalty, ideological discipline and the defense of national interests.

Chinese diplomats are not merely negotiators. They are also representatives of a political system in which defending national prestige and demonstrating resolve can carry considerable institutional significance.

Susan Shirk (2023), in Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, argues that China’s increasingly assertive external behavior has undermined the reassurance that previously accompanied its economic expansion.

The result has been a widening gap between Beijing’s declared intentions and how other countries perceive its conduct.

More recently, Jaehwan Lim, Asei Ito and Hongyong Zhang (2025), in their study Unpacking China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy: A Text-As-Data Approach, examine confrontational rhetoric in Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conferences. Their research demonstrates the value of analyzing diplomatic assertiveness through observable rhetorical patterns rather than treating every confrontational statement as an isolated episode.

This scholarship offers an important perspective on Jing’s conduct.

The ambassador’s remarks may appeal to domestic audiences who regard diplomatic restraint as weakness. But what projects strength at home may come across as intimidation abroad.

Indeed, wolf warrior diplomacy suffers from an inherent contradiction. Its language may reaffirm China’s national pride while simultaneously undermining the international confidence that Beijing needs to consolidate its status as a responsible major power.

It may satisfy nationalist expectations without improving China’s diplomatic relationships.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether Jing exceeded the limits of diplomatic propriety.

It is whether Beijing is prepared to tolerate a style of diplomacy that undermines its own international objectives.

Military superiority does not confer political legitimacy

Jing’s defenders may argue that his statement merely acknowledged an undeniable military reality.

China possesses substantially greater military capabilities than the Philippines. But diplomatic relations are not governed by the principle that the stronger state is entitled to greater sovereignty or political obedience.

The United Nations Charter rests on the sovereign equality of states and prohibits the threat or use of force against their territorial integrity or political independence.

That principle is particularly important in Southeast Asia, where smaller countries must navigate relationships with competing major powers while preserving their strategic autonomy.

Robert Jervis (1976), in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, demonstrates how the meaning attributed to political statements depends on historical experience, strategic expectations and existing perceptions of threat.

A statement intended as reassurance by one government may consequently be interpreted as intimidation by another.

This is precisely the danger confronting Chinese diplomacy in the Philippines.

The two countries are already involved in persistent disputes over maritime rights and territorial claims in the South China Sea.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea rejected the legal basis for China’s expansive claims to historic rights within the areas addressed by the ruling. Beijing refused to accept the award.

Subsequent confrontations involving Chinese and Philippine vessels have deepened mutual distrust.

Against this background, the ambassador’s reference to China’s military superiority cannot be separated from the security anxieties surrounding the West Philippine Sea.

Even if Beijing intended to communicate restraint, the statement could reasonably be interpreted as a reminder that China possesses the means to impose its preferences by force.

Diplomacy becomes counterproductive when reassurance sounds indistinguishable from intimidation.

Why smaller states resist intimidation

Beijing’s diplomatic dilemma is particularly consequential because China has invested enormous resources in cultivating relationships with developing countries.

Through trade, infrastructure financing, development cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, China has sought to establish itself as an economic partner capable of helping other countries achieve prosperity.

Yet economic cooperation cannot automatically translate into political loyalty.

Evelyn Goh (2007), examining Southeast Asian security strategies, explains how smaller states manage great-power relationships through engagement, institutional arrangements and efforts to preserve regional autonomy.

Their objective is not necessarily to confront a powerful neighbor. It is to prevent any single major power from acquiring unchecked influence over their political choices.

Jing’s rhetoric risks reinforcing precisely the concerns that encourage smaller states to seek additional security partnerships.

China frequently criticizes the Philippines for expanding defense cooperation with the United States and other security partners.

But the more Chinese officials emphasize their country’s military dominance, the easier it becomes for Philippine policymakers to justify strengthening those relationships.

Here lies the paradox of coercive diplomacy.

A major power may believe that demonstrating overwhelming strength will discourage resistance. Yet the same demonstration may convince smaller states that they need external protection.

China’s military superiority is not in dispute.

What remains contested is whether Beijing can exercise that superiority without making its neighbors feel threatened.

The loss of face Beijing should worry about

There is another dimension to this controversy that Chinese diplomats should understand particularly well: the relationship between international status, recognition and national prestige.

Peter Hays Gries (2004), in China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, demonstrates how historical grievances, national pride and questions of international recognition have shaped Chinese political identity and foreign-policy discourse.

China’s sensitivity to international standing is closely connected to its historical narrative of national humiliation and subsequent rejuvenation.

The Chinese concept of miànzi, or face, provides a useful interpretive perspective.

Face concerns not simply an actor’s own understanding of its status but also how that status is acknowledged by others.

Applied to international diplomacy, the implication is straightforward: A country cannot establish its legitimacy as a responsible major power merely by repeatedly asserting its strength.

Its status also depends on recognition by other states.

And recognition cannot simply be commanded.

Beijing may wish to be respected as a leading power. But respect is different from fear, just as international recognition is different from coerced submission.

An ambassador who publicly reminds a smaller country that China could defeat it may believe he is defending national prestige.

Yet the same statement may damage China’s reputation by reinforcing perceptions of arrogance and intimidation.

This is the irony of Jing’s remarks.

In attempting to project China’s strength, he may have diminished the very international standing his government seeks to cultivate.

Wolf warrior diplomacy can therefore produce a reputational contradiction: The more aggressively China demands respect, the more difficult it may become to secure that respect voluntarily.

Beijing must decide what kind of power it wants to be

There are legitimate disagreements between Manila and Beijing over maritime claims, security cooperation and the regional balance of power.

China is entitled to articulate its positions and defend what it regards as its national interests.

The Philippines is equally entitled to protect its sovereignty, assert its lawful maritime rights and reject statements it considers threatening.

But diplomacy exists precisely to manage such disagreements without allowing them to escalate into armed confrontation.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) establishes the institutional framework for diplomatic representation and communication. Jing’s remarks do not, by themselves, establish a violation of that convention. They do, however, raise serious questions about diplomatic judgment, restraint and the responsibilities of an ambassador representing a major power.

Some Philippine lawmakers have called for Jing to be declared persona non grata. Others have warned that expelling him could further damage an already strained relationship.

That debate is understandable.

But Beijing need not wait for Manila to take such action.

The Chinese government can recall Jing on its own initiative and appoint a representative whose diplomatic approach better reflects its professed commitment to peaceful coexistence and sovereign equality.

Such a decision would not constitute a concession on the maritime dispute.

Nor would it imply that China must abandon its national interests.

It would simply demonstrate that Beijing understands the difference between defending those interests and publicly reminding smaller countries of their military vulnerability.

There is, of course, a deeper question for Xi Jinping himself.

If confrontational rhetoric continues to emerge from China’s diplomatic establishment, the problem cannot be attributed exclusively to individual ambassadors. It also reflects the incentives and political expectations operating within China’s foreign-policy institutions.

Recalling Jing would address the immediate controversy. Reconsidering the diplomatic culture that encourages such rhetoric would address the larger problem.

Beijing cannot credibly advocate a shared future for humanity while allowing its representatives to suggest that peace ultimately depends on the restraint of the stronger power.

The Philippines does not need a Chinese ambassador to explain that China is militarily stronger.

Filipinos already know that.

What they need to know is whether Beijing recognizes that sovereignty is not measured by military strength and that smaller countries are entitled to the same dignity and independence as larger ones.

Great powers do not earn respect merely by demonstrating how easily they can defeat their neighbors. They earn it by demonstrating why their neighbors have no reason to fear them.

If Beijing truly wants to be regarded as a responsible global leader, recalling Ambassador Jing Quan would be a sensible place to begin.

References:

Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines. 2026. Statements concerning Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan’s October 15 remarks and his October 19 summons.

Goh, Evelyn. 2007. “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies.” International Security 32 (3): 113–157. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.113.

Gries, Peter Hays. 2004. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lim, Jaehwan, Asei Ito, and Hongyong Zhang. 2025. “Unpacking China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy: A Text-As-Data Approach.” Journal of Contemporary China. Published online. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2025.2557845.

Martin, Peter. 2021. China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. 2023. Statements and outcomes of the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, December 27–28.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs.

Permanent Court of Arbitration. 2016. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). Award, July 12.

Reuters. 2026. “Philippines Summons China’s Envoy over Remarks Conveying ‘Threat.’” October 19.

Shambaugh, David. 2013. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shirk, Susan L. 2023. Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise. New York: Oxford University Press.

United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations.

United Nations. 1961. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.