There is an important question that the Armed Forces of the Philippines—and, frankly, the entire Philippine government—needs to answer.

When the AFP warns that foreign malign influence operations are exploiting domestic controversies such as the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte and the flood-control scandal, exactly where does legitimate Filipino criticism end and foreign influence begin?

Because there is a danger here that we should not ignore.
The danger is not only that China may be manipulating Filipinos.
The danger is also that the legitimate exercise of free speech may eventually be treated as evidence of manipulation simply because it happens to criticize the government.

And that would be a terrible mistake.

The AFP’s warning, as reported by the Inquirer, is serious. Retired Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad said malign information operations have increasingly shifted toward domestic controversies, including the impeachment and the flood-control issue. He said these operations can twist narratives in ways favorable to China while attacking officials who take positions against Chinese interests. AFP spokesperson Col. Francel Padilla said the military is monitoring the information environment and that its “greatest weapon is the truth.”

Fine.
Then let us start with the truth.

The Philippines is facing an enormous controversy over its flood-control program.

And despite the scandal surrounding these projects, the proposed 2027 National Expenditure Program still contains ₱107.4 billion for flood-control projects under the Department of Public Works and Highways. The DBM has already formally released the FY 2027 NEP, while reporting on the proposal noted that the allocation comes amid ongoing corruption investigations.

So let me ask a very simple question: If a Filipino taxpayer says, “Why are we still allocating ₱107 billion for flood-control projects when the existing flood-control system is already under a massive corruption scandal—is that person now a foreign-influence operator?

If a journalist asks why the government continues to pour billions into a program whose implementation is under intense scrutiny, is that Chinese propaganda?

If a Filipino says, “Investigate the contractors, engineers, politicians and government officials involved before spending another ₱107 billion,” is that an information operation?

If a citizen demands transparency over where every peso goes, is that somehow an attack on Philippine sovereignty?

Surely not. And this is precisely why we need to draw a very bright line between foreign interference and legitimate dissent.

China absolutely has an interest in influencing Philippine public opinion.
There is evidence of this.

Reuters reported in 2025 on an alleged Chinese information operation in the Philippines involving fake social media accounts, pro-Beijing narratives, and efforts to undermine support for the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The reporting described an operation involving a Manila-based marketing firm and accounts allegedly funded by the Chinese embassy. Beijing denied interfering in Philippine internal affairs.

But here is the important point: The existence of Chinese influence operations does not mean every Filipino who expresses a position favorable to China—or critical of the Philippine government—is a Chinese agent.

And conversely, someone does not become a patriot merely because he is anti-China.
We need evidence.

That principle becomes even more important when we look at Taiwan.

China has been conducting influence operations against Taiwan for years.

Taiwan is not confronting some new phenomenon that suddenly appeared in 2024.

It has been dealing with Chinese information manipulation, propaganda, fake accounts, content farms, attempts to influence political narratives and efforts to exploit divisions in Taiwanese society for years.

A policy study published by the National Defense College of the Philippines describes the Philippines as one of the main targets of Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference and explicitly compares the Philippine experience with Taiwan. It notes that Chinese operations targeting the Philippines predate 2020, including the operation identified by Graphika as “Operation Naval Grazing,” involving coordinated fake accounts disseminating content supporting Chinese geopolitical interests.

And Taiwan has been the much larger laboratory.

During the 2024 Taiwanese elections, Chinese influence operations reportedly used increasingly sophisticated methods—including artificial intelligence, fake and manipulated content, coordinated networks, content farms and attempts to exploit trusted local sources—to shape Taiwanese public opinion.

The National Defense College’s analysis describes China’s approach toward Taiwan as centralized, timed and multifaceted, involving attacks on Taiwanese political and economic narratives alongside military intimidation. It also notes that China has attempted to acquire social-media accounts and use influencers to disseminate favorable narratives.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies likewise examined Chinese disinformation campaigns against both Taiwan and the Philippines, finding that Beijing uses information operations to discredit political leaders in Taiwan while pushing narratives in the Philippines that portray China positively and cast doubt on the United States.

So yes—China’s influence operations are real.
They are serious.
They are persistent.
And the Philippines should absolutely defend itself.
But there is another lesson we should learn from Taiwan.

Taiwan did not defend democracy by telling its citizens to stop criticizing their government.
It defended democracy by making citizens harder to manipulate.

After Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, fact-checking organizations, the election commission, civil society and media organizations worked to expose false narratives, manipulated videos and fabricated claims. The response emphasized transparency, public education and rapid fact-checking rather than simply declaring dissent to be foreign propaganda.

That is the lesson the Philippines should take.
Not censorship.
Not political labeling.
Not “if you disagree with us, you are working for China.”
Evidence.
Because there is a fundamental difference between saying:
“China is trying to manipulate Filipinos.”
and saying:
“Anyone criticizing this government may be part of China’s manipulation.”
The first statement may be a legitimate national-security warning.
The second would be a threat to democratic discourse.
And the distinction matters enormously today.

Consider the flood-control scandal.
Filipinos have every reason to ask where the money went.
They have every reason to ask why projects were approved.
They have every reason to ask who benefited.
They have every reason to question contractors.
They have every reason to question government agencies.
And they have every reason to ask why another ₱107.4 billion is being proposed for flood control in the 2027 budget despite the enormous controversy surrounding the program.
None of those questions requires Beijing.
Those questions come from Filipino taxpayers.
They come from people whose homes flood.
They come from commuters stranded in floodwaters.
They come from families whose businesses are destroyed by floods.
They come from citizens who pay taxes and have a constitutional right to demand accountability from their government.

If someone takes those legitimate grievances and deliberately manipulates them on behalf of a foreign power, then expose that person.
Show us the evidence.
Identify the network.
Show us the accounts.
Follow the money.
Explain the coordination.
Demonstrate the connection.
That is how a democratic country fights foreign interference.
Not by making citizens afraid to ask questions.

Because once Filipinos become afraid that criticizing a government project might get them branded as a foreign agent, the information war has already achieved something far more dangerous than a viral fake-news post.

It has made citizens police their own speech.
And that is not national security.
That is democratic surrender.
There is another uncomfortable reality we need to acknowledge.

China’s influence campaign in the Philippines is not new.

The Philippines has been part of Beijing’s broader strategic information environment for years, just as Taiwan has been.
Our geographic location makes us particularly important.
Our alliance with the United States makes us strategically important.
Our proximity to Taiwan makes us strategically important.
And our internal political divisions make us vulnerable.
That is why China has an incentive to amplify narratives that deepen those divisions.
The goal of an effective influence operation is not necessarily to make every Filipino love China.
Sometimes it is enough to make Filipinos hate one another.
Make Marcos supporters hate Duterte supporters.
Make Duterte supporters hate Marcos supporters.
Make nationalists hate liberals.
Make liberals hate nationalists.
Make Filipinos distrust journalists.
Make citizens distrust the military.
Make people believe elections are rigged.
Make them believe every investigation is politically motivated.
Make them believe every institution is corrupt.
And eventually, make them believe that democracy itself does not work.
That is how a country becomes vulnerable.

So, yes, let us expose Chinese influence.

But let us also protect the right of Filipinos to criticize their own government.

Let us distinguish a Chinese information operation from an angry Filipino taxpayer.
Let us distinguish foreign manipulation from investigative journalism.
Let us distinguish coordinated propaganda from political disagreement.
And let us distinguish fake news from inconvenient facts.
The AFP says its greatest weapon is the truth.
I agree.
Then give the Filipino people the truth.
Tell us who is behind the information operations.
Show us the evidence.
Expose the networks.
Expose the money.
Expose the fake accounts.
But do not tell Filipinos that questioning a ₱107-billion flood-control allocation makes them agents of China.
Because if that becomes the standard, then the Chinese do not even have to silence Filipinos.
We will silence ourselves.
And that would be the greatest victory any foreign influence operation could possibly achieve.