Duterte’s net satisfaction rating on a downtrend

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President Rodrigo Duterte’s net satisfaction rating looks like it on a downtrend, according to the latest  Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey.

The latest SWS survey showed Duterte’s net satisfaction rating dropped to +62 for June 2020, which reflects a downtrend when taking into account his +65 net satisfaction rating in May 2021 and +79 in November 2020.

When Duterte got a +79 net satisfaction rate in November 2020, the SWS survey showed that 51 percent of the respondents said they were “very satisfied,” 33 percent stated they were “somewhat satisfied,” while 9 percent were “undecided. Furthermore, 4 percent said they were “somewhat dissatisfied” and 2 percent were “very dissatisfied.”

In May 2021 when Duterte got a +65 net satisfaction rating, the SWS logged 34 percent respondents as “very satisfied,” 41 percent said they were “somewhat satisfied” while 4 percent were very “dissatisfied.” Also, 6 percent were “somewhat dissatisfied” and 15 percent were “undecided.”

For the June 2021, those who said they “very satisfied” remained at 34 percent, while 41 percent said they were “somewhat satisfied.” Furthermore, those who said they were “somewhat dissatisfied” increased to 9 percent, 4 percent were “very dissatisfied while 12 percent were undecided.

To recall, Duterte got +64 net satisfaction rating in September 2016, or just a few months after he assumed office as President.

SWS fellow and political science professor Jorge Tigno said that Duterte’s high rating in November 2020 must have been rooted in the public’s impression that the Covid-19 pandemic was being effectively dealt with by the government.

“I would situate that in that context when people were sensing that, ‘okay this is now starting to be over and we’re relieved this has happened and that we’re satisfied with what the government has done,’” Tigno said.


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