Go-Duterte tandem: Will this tandem win?

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The Cusi faction of the PDP-Laban has just endorsed the Go-Duterte tandem for 2022. And it seems that they are deadly serious about it. What just happened?

First off, I think negotiations between the camps of presidential daughter Sara Duterte and that of former SAP and now Senator Bong Go probably fell thru as rumors of a Bongbong Marcos-Sara Duterte emerge from the rut. As what I wrote several posts ago, Malacanang insiders had been trying to pacify and consolidate both the Sara Duterte and Go groups together and combined, may be able to secure victory come 2022 polls. These groups had not been seeing eye-to-eye since the beginning of the Duterte administration particularly when Go created his own clique within Malacanan.

Such an announcement from the PDP-Laban effectively shattered Senator Manny Pacquiao’s dreams of running for the presidency. Pacquiao and Pimentel were effectively silenced by moves initiated by the Cusi-Matibag faction–former altar boys of former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While this Cusi faction holds the top posts of the party, they do not control city-level executives who are also busy trying to protect their political interests in their respective jurisdictions. Many sources say, the Pimentel-Pacquiao faction actually controls more people within the party than those of the Cusi-Matibag clique.

Therefore, while this Go-Duterte tandem pronouncement of the PDP-Laban seems strong, the possibility of it clinching the top posts come 2022 is very slim. I believe this is just a bogey, a ploy to test whether or not this tandem would resonate with voters. If it does not, then, the most obvious tandem that this administration hopes to pit with the opposition would surely be BBM-Duterte.


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