LGUs push contact tracing for Delta variant cases

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Local government units (LGUs) are undertaking stringent contact tracing measures of those who had made close contacts with the people confirmed in the Philippine to be infected with the Delta variant of the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19).

Department of Health (DOH) said Friday that as of July 22, the country recorded 47 Delta variant cases – 36 have recovered, three died, and eight are still active.

Of the total number, 24 are returning overseas Filipinos while the 23 others are local cases.

“We still have to receive the complete reports of these contact tracing efforts, but local governments are doing their contact tracing right now,” DOH Undersecretary Maria Rosario Vergeire said during an online media briefing.

Among the local cases, six are from Region 3, two from Calabarzon, two from Region 6, six from Region 10, and seven from the National Capital Region.

About 76 percent of the Delta variant cases are aged 14 to 79 years and are males.

“As for the vaccination status, two cases received two doses of Covid-19 vaccine, four cases received one dose while 18 cases were confirmed not to be vaccinated while the vaccination status of the remaining cases is currently being verified,” Vergeire said.

The additional 12 cases reported on Thursday were all tagged as recovered.

Their ages range from 19 to 58 years old and nine are males. Their vaccination statuses are under verification.

The DOH said the additional 12 Delta variant cases are all local cases — six from Bataan, two from Laguna, one from Manila, two from Pasig, and one from Taguig.

“Tayo ay talagang nakikipag-usap sa mga local governments dahil ayaw naman nating tuluyang kumalat ang mga (We’re coordinating with the local governments to prevent the spread of) variants of concern, specifically the Delta variant,” Vergeire said.

She added that the government is implementing all strategies to contain the local transmission and keep it from becoming a community transmission.


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