Extension of ECQ to be decided on Saturday

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The Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID) will discuss on Saturday the implementation of quarantine classification in Metro Manila and four nearby provinces after April 11, Malacañang said on Thursday.

This developed after some members of the Cabinet met Thursday to tackle the government’s response efforts to curb the spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) in the country, Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque said in a press statement.

“The Inter-Agency Task Force shall meet on Saturday, April 10, 2021, to discuss the quarantine classification of the National Capital Region Plus,” Roque said.

Metro Manila, Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, or the so-called “NCR Plus,” have been placed under the most restrictive enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) since March 29.

President Rodrigo Duterte has approved the release of P23 billion worth of emergency subsidy to around 22.9 million beneficiaries affected by the implementation of ECQ.

Each recipient can avail of either in-kind or cash assistance amounting to P1,000 per person or P4,000 per family.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development has provided the local government units (LGUs) with a list of qualified beneficiaries for the latest round of financial aid following the reimposition of ECQ in NCR Plus.

During the meeting, Cabinet officials also agreed to let the LGUs “at the barangay level” handle the prepositioning of goods, including the distribution of wellness kits to those who tested positive for Covid-19, Roque said.

Roque added that the government is also exhausting all efforts to address the issue of hazard pay of healthcare workers.

Last week, Malacañang floated the possible shift to a more relaxed modified ECQ (MECQ), in case the government’s Prevent-Detect-Isolate-Treat-Reintegrate strategies turn out to be effective in lowering daily Covid-19 infections.

Medical front-liners from the Visayas have volunteered to be sent to Metro Manila, the epicenter of the Covid-19 pandemic, to help beat the coronavirus.


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