Indonesia’s Islamic body gives ‘religious approval’ for Chinese Covid vaccine

on

Indonesia’s highest Islamic body on Friday gave its religious approval to China’s Sinovac vaccine, paving the way for its distribution in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The Indonesian Ulema Council announced that the vaccine for the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) is holy and halal, or fit for consumption by Muslims.

 

The head of the council’s Fatwa Department Asorirun Niam Sholeh also said that the complete fatwa, or religious edict, related to the safety of the vaccine is still waiting for the green light from the Indonesian Food and Drug Authority.

The drug regulator said it would draw from data of the clinical trials in Brazil and Turkey, as well as own trial results before authorizing use of the vaccine.

Indonesia has had its own late-stage clinical trials of the vaccine, but with smaller pool size than Brazil with just 1,620 participants. The clinical trial research team is expected to report the results to the regulator and state-owned pharmaceutical firm Bio Farma soon.

If given conditional approval, President Joko Widodo said that he will receive the first shot next week, with some of the ministers and senior officials, followed health care workers and other public servants.

Indonesia has signed agreements with Sinovac for millions of doses of the vaccine, which requires two shots. Some 3 million doses have already arrived in Indonesia and are being distributed across the vast archipelago nation in preparation for rollout.

Indonesia also has agreements with other vaccine companies including Novavax and AstraZeneca, though none has arrived in the country yet.

Indonesia recorded the highest daily number of cases with 10,617 on Friday. It brings the total to 808,340. It also recorded 233 deaths in the last 24 hours, taking the toll to 23,753. CURRENTPH

 

 

 


Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

LEAVE A REPLY

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

MUST READ

Defunding Rail Maintenance: Keeping Today’s Trains Alive for Tomorrow’s...

One Metro Manila line still runs cars that first carried passengers in December 1999, nearly 27 years ago (DOTr, 1999). At rush hour, many...

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER!

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER! Mas madali at mas convenient na ang pagkuha ng bus tickets! Alamin kung paano gagawing mas mabilis at...

MC Taxi Riders Appeal to LTFRB amidst Overboarding Issue

MANILA, Philippines, October 22, 2026 — Motorcycle taxi riders are calling on the Marcos administration and transport regulatory bodies to provide those operating beyond...

China’s Wolf Warriors are Back. Beijing Should Recall Its...

China's ambassador to the Philippines has accomplished in a few sentences what years of Chinese public diplomacy have struggled to prevent: He has reinforced the perception that Beijing regards its smaller neighbors not as sovereign equals, but as countries expected to accommodate its growing military and economic power.

Beyond the 2027 Invasion Timeline: Diplomatic Isolation, Ontological Security,...

This paper challenges military-centered assessments of a possible People's Republic of China (PRC) operation against Taiwan by 2027, arguing that Beijing's calculations may depend not only on military readiness and economic costs but also on diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy, and political identity. It advances a conditional framework integrating ontological security theory, the Chinese sociological concept of mianzi (face), and recognition politics. The paper proposes that Taiwan's declining diplomatic recognition could strengthen Beijing's sovereignty narrative, create a perceived loss of face for Taiwan's governing authorities, and alter the political conditions under which Beijing considers coercive or military unification. Drawing on official PRC statements, U.S. security assessments, and international relations scholarship, the analysis develops three propositions concerning recognition, status vulnerability, and coercive decision-making. It argues that complete diplomatic isolation could represent a significant political threshold without necessarily eliminating Taiwan's international relationships or legitimizing the use of force. The paper contributes to cross-strait security studies by identifying diplomatic recognition as a potentially important condition that shapes Beijing's assessment of the political feasibility and costs of unification, beyond conventional materialist explanations.

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading