Gov’t issues guidelines on gradual resumption of economic activity in GCQ areas

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The Inter-Agency Task Force on COVID-19 response has released on Friday the guidelines on the gradual resumption of economic activity in areas under a general community quarantine (GCQ).

Industries that could resume full operations are the following:
agriculture,
fisheries,
forestry,
food manufacturing and its entire supply chain (including ink, packaging, raw materials, etc.),
food retail (supermarket, market, and restaurant for takeout and delivery only),
healthcare (hospitals, clinics, drugstores),
logistics,
water,
energy,
Internet,
telecommunications, and
media.
Establishments that could operate at 50-100% capacity are the following:
manufacturing of electronics and exports,
e-commerce and delivery for essential and non-essential items,
repair and maintenance services,
housing, and
office services.

For these establishments, a 50% onsite work and 50% work from home arrangement would be implemented:  

financial services,
business process outsourcing,
other non-leisure wholesale and retail trade and other non-leisure services.

These establishments and activities, however, will remain closed/prohibited:
schools (late opening in September at the earliest) except online learning,
leisure,
amusement,
gaming,
fitness,
“kid” industry,
tourism, and
all gatherings, including religious and conferences, etc.

Restricted mall openings covering non-leisure shops would be allowed, and priority and essential construction projects could resume.

Starting May 1, places of low and moderate COVID-19 risk would be under GCQ, in which public transportation would resume at reduced capacity, some workers would be allowed to work and some establishments would partially open but subject to minimum health standards.

However, areas with a high risk of COVID-19 transmissions such as Metro Manila and Central Luzon would remain under strict confinement measures until May 15 under the enhanced community quarantine./Stacy Ang


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