When a head of government faces a storm of scandal and elite defections, one tempting instrument is the constitutional emergency: suspension of habeas corpus or proclamation of martial law. Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the president may, “in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,” suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law (Philippines 1987, sec. 15). These powers are bounded on paper — the president must report to Congress within 48 hours, and Congress may revoke or extend the proclamation — but history warns that formal checks can be eroded in practice (Philippines 1987).

The notion that a president might pre-empt a possible coup by invoking martial law is not merely hypothetical. Martial rule centralizes command, controls the security apparatus, and delegitimizes opposition by reframing dissent as a threat to public order. Yet whether such a move would succeed — or be a pyrrhic attempt overturned by popular mobilization — depends on three intersecting variables: institutional capacity and constraint, elite cohesion or defection, and the mobilizational capacity of civil society.

First, constitutional authority is necessary but insufficient. The 1987 charter explicitly constrains emergency powers, reflecting the post-Marcos constitutional architects’ intent to avoid a repeat of 1972 (Philippines 1987). Still, scholars remind us that institutional form often diverges from political practice: well-crafted rules only matter if state actors respect them and if institutional enforcers (courts, legislatures, the military) retain autonomy (North 1990). Contemporary scholarship on coups reinforces this point: coup risk spikes not simply when legal rules are weak but when multiple stressors — economic decline, governance failure, exclusion — converge and erode elites’ willingness to defend institutions (IMF 2024). In short, the formal ability to declare martial law does not guarantee that the declaration will be respected or that it will restore stability.

Second, elite cohesion is decisive. Historical episodes in the Philippines show that the military will not move alone: successful extra-constitutional changes typically occur when a critical mass of political, business, and security elites withdraws support from the incumbent (Claudio 2014; Mass Protests and Security-Elite Defection 2022). Research on coup dynamics also finds that coup-proofing tactics (rival forces, patronage) may deter plots among senior commanders but cannot fully prevent mutinies or passive noncompliance lower down the chain (Albrecht and Eibl 2018). The Marcos Jr. presidency benefits from dynastic and elite networks that consolidate support, but recent investigations into flood control projects and other scandals — and the public resignations and denunciations they have produced — signal the very elite strain that precedes institutional breakdown (Acuña, Alejandro, and Leung 2025; Reuters 2025). If elite defections become widespread, a martial-law proclamation may be a last-ditch effort that lacks the internal coherence to be enforced.

Third, the people’s capacity to resist matters more in the Philippines than in many other settings. The 1986 People Power example remains analytically potent: mass nonviolent mobilization, coupled with elite and military defections, toppled an entrenched dictatorship despite the formal power of martial rule (Schock 1999; Origins 2019). Scholars of contentious politics show that protest becomes decisive when it reaches a tipping point that alters elites’ cost–benefit calculations and creates space for defections (Mass Protests and Security-Elite Defection 2022). In the modern information environment, the speed and reach of media and social platforms can either amplify state narratives or accelerate delegitimization; in Estrada’s fall, media exposure of corruption converted elite displeasure into decisive action (Claudio 2014). Today’s large, plural protests — and the Church and civic groups’ organizing — replicate the social preconditions that allowed Filipinos to resist past extra-constitutional rule (Amnesty Philippines 2022; Guardian 2025).

So how likely is it that Marcos Jr. would invoke martial law to deter a coup, and would the people avert it? The prudent answer is cautious skepticism of a clean, successful martial-law gambit.

A president contemplating martial law must weigh four costs. Legally, the move invites congressional review and judicial scrutiny (Philippines 1987). Politically, it risks catalyzing further elite defections: elites who fear expropriation or reputational damage may withdraw support rather than face the uncertainty of an authoritarian escalation (IMF 2024). With rising public distrust in Congress and even the judiciary, which institution would then support such a move?

Operationally, it requires reliable security forces ready to enforce extraordinary measures; where lower-level disaffection exists, enforcement is unreliable (Albrecht and Eibl 2018). And normatively, in the Philippines, the symbolic costs are high: invoking the specter of martial law reawakens memories of brutality and dispossession under Marcos Sr., increasing public rage and mobilization (Talamayan 2025).

Empirically, therefore, martial law used as a preventive tool is a high-risk, low-reward strategy. It may deter an immediate coup if the security hierarchy remains cohesive and elites decide to back the president’s emergency framing. But if elite support is fraying — and if mass mobilization is already underway — the proclamation can produce the opposite effect: it crystallizes anti-government coalitions, legitimizes protest, and provides moral cover for elite and military defection. This is precisely the feedback loop scholars identify when institutions are hollow: extraordinary measures intended to shore up authority instead accelerate collapse (North 1990; Claudio 2014).

Finally, the people’s ability to avert a martial-law imposition depends on two contemporary advantages: the organizational density of civil society and the rapid transmission of information. The Philippines still possesses vibrant networks of churches, NGOs, student groups, and labor federations that can mobilize quickly (Amnesty Philippines 2022). Social media accelerates collective action but also creates vulnerability to disinformation — a double-edged sword that regime actors may try to exploit. Still, the historical memory of People Power and the symbolic potency of places like EDSA remain powerful bulwarks against normalization of emergency rule (Origins 2019; Schock 1999).

Conclusion: A martial-law proclamation as a pre-emptive deterrent to coup carries serious political and operational hazards. It will succeed only under narrow conditions of elite cohesion and military compliance; in most plausible scenarios today — where corruption scandals have already produced elite strain and large-scale public protest — invoking martial law would likely backfire, accelerating elite defection and popular resistance. The Philippines’ experience teaches that legal powers alone do not secure regime survival; legitimacy, elite alliances, and civic mobilization still do. If citizens and civil society mobilize rapidly, as they have in the past, a heavy-handed emergency declaration is more likely to be a catalyst for downfall than a shield against it.

Selected references:

Acuña, Rafael; Aldie Alejandro; Robert Leung. 2025. “The Families that Stay Together: A Network Analysis of Dynastic Power in Philippine Politics.” Working paper, May 27, 2025.
Albrecht, Holger, and Ferdinand Eibl. 2018. “How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups.” International Studies Quarterly 62 (2): 315–328.
Amnesty Philippines. 2022. “EDSA People Power Revolution.” Amnesty International Philippines.
Claudio, Lisandro E. 2014. “From Scandalous Politics to Public Scandal: Corruption, Media, and the Collapse of the Estrada Regime in the Philippines.” Asian Politics & Policy 6 (4): 539–554.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. “Political Fragility: Coups d’État and Their Drivers.” IMF Working Paper No. 2024/034. Washington, D.C.
Mass Protests, Security-Elite Defection, and Revolution. 2022. Journal of Comparative Economics 50 (4): 1001–1016.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Origins: The People Power Revolution. 2019. Ohio State University Origins Project.
Philippines. 1987. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Reuters. 2025. “Philippines’ Marcos says no one will be spared in infrastructure corruption probe,” September 15, 2025.
Schock, Kurt. 1999. “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma.” Social Problems 46 (3): 479–505.
Talamayan, F. 2025. “Populist desires, nostalgic narratives: the Marcos golden memory” Asian Studies Review (forthcoming).