SWS survey shows 60% of Filipinos oppose Duterte’s VP bid

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A latest survey by the Social Weather Survey (SWS) showed that 60 percent of adult Filipinos believe that President Rodrigo Duterte’s running for vice president in 2022 violates the intention of the Constitution.

On the other hand, 39 percent said Duterte should run for vice president in 2022 because they liked his style of management.

“By area, the proportion of those who say it would violate the Constitution if President Duterte runs in 2022 was highest in Balance Luzon (65 percent), followed by the Visayas (59 percent), Metro Manila (56 percent), and Mindanao (53 percent),” the SWS said.

“Majorities in all educational levels also share this view: 67 percent among non-elementary graduates, 70 percent among elementary graduates, 52 percent among junior high school graduates, and 61 percent among college graduates,” it added.

Those opposing Duterte’s vice presidential bid in 2022 were among those who were dissatisfied with his performance as chief executive. The June 2021 survey of the SWS showed that Duterte got a net satisfaction rating of +62 percent, which is a big drop from the +79 he got in November 2020.

“Those who oppose a Vice-Presidential bid for President Duterte in 2022 were highest among very dissatisfied with his performance as president (88 percent), followed by those somewhat dissatisfied (83 percent), undecided (81 percent) somewhat satisfied (62 percent), and very satisfied (42 percent),” SWS said.

“On the other hand, those who favor a vice-presidential bid for Pres. Duterte in 2022 was highest among those very satisfied with his performance (58 percent), followed by those somewhat satisfied (38 percent), undecided (19 percent), somewhat dissatisfied (17 percent), and very dissatisfied (12 percent),” it added.

SWS conducted its Second Quarter 2021 Social Weather Survey from June 23 to 26, 2021, using face-to-face interviews of 1,200 adults (18 years old and above) nationwide: 300 each in Metro Manila, Balance Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao.


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