PH to get Sputnik V vaccines starting May

on

The initial batch of government-procured Sputnik V vaccines from Russia was finally shipped from Moscow and would be arriving in Manila on May 1, Philippine Ambassador to Russia Carlos Sorreta reported Thursday night.

Sorreta said a total of 15,000 doses were sent from Russia on April 29, with “more to come” in the next weeks and months.

“Great working with the DOH (Department of Health), DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs), Special Envoy for Russia, and the other members of the IATF (Inter-Agency Task Force) to make this happen. Thank you to President (Vladimir) Putin, Foreign Minister (Sergey) Lavrov and Foreign Ministry officials, the Russian Direct Investment Fund, and the Gamaleya Institute for their cooperation, patience, and understanding. Thank you too to our hardworking Philippine Embassy Team,” he said on his social media account.

The delivery was supposed to arrive last April 28 but was postponed due to a lack of direct flight from Moscow to Manila.

The cold storage requirements also made it hard to transport the Russian vaccines since they must be stored with a temperature not exceeding -18 degrees Celsius.

Participating in the initial Sputnik V rollout are cities that meet this storage requirement such as Manila, Taguig, Makati, Parañaque, and Muntinlupa. Each city will receive an initial 3,000 doses each for the simulation activity.

Sorreta earlier said a total of 500,000 doses will be delivered within May and eventually about 20 million doses before the year ends.

He said Gamaleya Research Institute is keen on manufacturing the shots locally by partnering with the private sector.

Sputnik V is the world’s first registered vaccine, with 91.6- percent efficacy against coronavirus disease 2019 as validated by internationally peer-reviewed data published in the medical journal The Lancet.

 


Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

LEAVE A REPLY

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

MUST READ

Defunding Rail Maintenance: Keeping Today’s Trains Alive for Tomorrow’s...

Buhayin ang Lumang Tren By Paul Y. Chua, PhD One Metro Manila line still runs cars that first carried passengers in December 1999, nearly 27 years...

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER!

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER! Mas madali at mas convenient na ang pagkuha ng bus tickets! Alamin kung paano gagawing mas mabilis at...

MC Taxi Riders Appeal to LTFRB amidst Overboarding Issue

MANILA, Philippines, October 22, 2026 — Motorcycle taxi riders are calling on the Marcos administration and transport regulatory bodies to provide those operating beyond...

China’s Wolf Warriors are Back. Beijing Should Recall Its...

China's ambassador to the Philippines has accomplished in a few sentences what years of Chinese public diplomacy have struggled to prevent: He has reinforced the perception that Beijing regards its smaller neighbors not as sovereign equals, but as countries expected to accommodate its growing military and economic power.

Beyond the 2027 Invasion Timeline: Diplomatic Isolation, Ontological Security,...

This paper challenges military-centered assessments of a possible People's Republic of China (PRC) operation against Taiwan by 2027, arguing that Beijing's calculations may depend not only on military readiness and economic costs but also on diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy, and political identity. It advances a conditional framework integrating ontological security theory, the Chinese sociological concept of mianzi (face), and recognition politics. The paper proposes that Taiwan's declining diplomatic recognition could strengthen Beijing's sovereignty narrative, create a perceived loss of face for Taiwan's governing authorities, and alter the political conditions under which Beijing considers coercive or military unification. Drawing on official PRC statements, U.S. security assessments, and international relations scholarship, the analysis develops three propositions concerning recognition, status vulnerability, and coercive decision-making. It argues that complete diplomatic isolation could represent a significant political threshold without necessarily eliminating Taiwan's international relationships or legitimizing the use of force. The paper contributes to cross-strait security studies by identifying diplomatic recognition as a potentially important condition that shapes Beijing's assessment of the political feasibility and costs of unification, beyond conventional materialist explanations.

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading