Myanmar military fires rockets at rebel bases

on

Rockets were fired at two Myanmar government air bases on Thursday, causing minor damage but no injuries, the military junta said. The attacks are the latest sign that as the junta attempts to control widespread protests in cities against its February seizure of power, it is facing new military challenges in other areas.

No group claimed responsibility for the attacks on the bases in Magway and Meiktila in central Myanmar, and the government said it is seeking those responsible.

Capt. Aye Thazin Myint, a junta spokeswoman, said at a news conference in the capital, Naypyitaw, that four 107mm rockets were fired at the air force base in Magway at 3 a.m. Thursday, with three landing in a field and one on a road. She said one building was slightly damaged in the attack, which the military determined originated from two nearby villages.

She said five rockets were fired between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m. at the air base in Meiktila, where gunfire was also heard from nearby villages.

The rockets are commonly used by insurgent groups because they are are cheap and easily deployed, although they are not particularly accurate.

The junta, which ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in its Feb. 1 coup, is engaged in open warfare with guerrillas from the Kachin and Karen minorities which have allied themselves with the protest movement against military rule.

The Kachin, in northern Myanmar, and the Karen in the east have battled the central government for decades for greater autonomy, through periods of armed conflict and unsteady cease-fires. Both areas have experienced increased fighting in recent months and have been targeted by air strikes and ground attacks by government forces. The Karen on Tuesday captured a government base on the border with Thailand.

The military government has also stepped up its campaign against its opponents in cities, issuing arrest warrants for hundreds of activists including actors, internet influencers and doctors. Journalists have also been targeted.

Street protests are continuing but on a much smaller scale since the security forces stepped up their use of lethal force. More than 700 protesters and bystanders have been killed, according to several detailed tallies. The junta puts the figure at roughly one-third of that and says it used force appropriately to curb rioting.

The state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper reported Thursday that an accused protest leader, Wai Moe Naing, was formally charged with offenses including murder and treason for allegedly heading a well-organized local network of resisters to military rule.


Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

LEAVE A REPLY

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

MUST READ

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER!

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER! Mas madali at mas convenient na ang pagkuha ng bus tickets! Alamin kung paano gagawing mas mabilis at...

MC Taxi Riders Appeal to LTFRB amidst Overboarding Issue

MANILA, Philippines, October 22, 2026 — Motorcycle taxi riders are calling on the Marcos administration and transport regulatory bodies to provide those operating beyond...

China’s Wolf Warriors are Back. Beijing Should Recall Its...

China's ambassador to the Philippines has accomplished in a few sentences what years of Chinese public diplomacy have struggled to prevent: He has reinforced the perception that Beijing regards its smaller neighbors not as sovereign equals, but as countries expected to accommodate its growing military and economic power.

Beyond the 2027 Invasion Timeline: Diplomatic Isolation, Ontological Security,...

This paper challenges military-centered assessments of a possible People's Republic of China (PRC) operation against Taiwan by 2027, arguing that Beijing's calculations may depend not only on military readiness and economic costs but also on diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy, and political identity. It advances a conditional framework integrating ontological security theory, the Chinese sociological concept of mianzi (face), and recognition politics. The paper proposes that Taiwan's declining diplomatic recognition could strengthen Beijing's sovereignty narrative, create a perceived loss of face for Taiwan's governing authorities, and alter the political conditions under which Beijing considers coercive or military unification. Drawing on official PRC statements, U.S. security assessments, and international relations scholarship, the analysis develops three propositions concerning recognition, status vulnerability, and coercive decision-making. It argues that complete diplomatic isolation could represent a significant political threshold without necessarily eliminating Taiwan's international relationships or legitimizing the use of force. The paper contributes to cross-strait security studies by identifying diplomatic recognition as a potentially important condition that shapes Beijing's assessment of the political feasibility and costs of unification, beyond conventional materialist explanations.

El Niño, Ayuda and the Politics of Disaster: Are...

The Marcos administration is preparing billions of pesos in drought-related spending. But will that money build permanent water security, or deepen a political culture in which disaster relief becomes a source of electoral patronage?

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading