Metro Manila, 9 other areas to be under GCQ until Jan. 31 to prevent spread of new Covid variant

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President Rodrigo Duterte on Monday night announced that Metro Manila and nine other areas in the country will remain under general community quarantine (GCQ) status until January 31, 2021.

In a taped public address, Duterte said the provinces of Batangas, Isabela, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Norte, and cities of Santiago, Iloilo, Tacloban, Iligan, and Davao will also remain under GCQ until the end of January.

The rest of the country will also remain under the least restrictive modified general community quarantine (MGCQ), he added.

Duterte, however, said these community quarantine classifications are subject to appeal from their respective local government units (LGUs).

Duterte also reminded the public not to leave their homes unless absolutely necessary.

“Stay home if it’s really possible. It’s for your own good,” he said.

He earlier urged the public to skip Christmas festivities, especially large gatherings to avoid catching or spreading the disease.

As of Monday, health authorities logged a total of 470,650 confirmed Covid-19 cases, of which 22,746 or 4.8 percent are active cases.

A total of 104 patients recovered from the illness, raising the recoveries to 438,780 while 15 new fatalities brought the country’s death toll up to 9,124.

The Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID) is presently discussing efforts to prevent the entry of a new strain of coronavirus that emerged in the United Kingdom (UK).

Last Saturday, Duterte pitched for the creation of a new task force to focus on the new coronavirus strain that is reportedly more infectious. CURRENTPH


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