The Philippines is preparing for one of the most severe El Niño episodes in recent memory. And once again, the government’s response appears to be taking a familiar direction: billions of pesos in emergency allocations, agricultural assistance, subsidies and relief.

There is nothing inherently wrong with helping Filipinos survive a disaster. But there is something profoundly troubling about a government that repeatedly spends billions cushioning the consequences of predictable emergencies without demonstrating that it is investing enough to prevent the same suffering from recurring.

This time, the political stakes are particularly high.

The Department of Agriculture (DA) has proposed a staggering ₱61.99-billion El Niño action plan. The government has separately identified ₱7.86 billion for disaster response, while the proposed 2027 national budget includes an additional ₱10 billion for Presidential Assistance to Farmers and Fisherfolk (Department of Agriculture 2026; Philippine News Agency 2026; House of Representatives 2026).

The ₱61.99-billion plan includes previously released funds, and some of these allocations may overlap. They cannot simply be added together and described as an entirely new El Niño budget.

Nevertheless, the amounts involved are substantial. And they raise an uncomfortable political question: Is the Marcos administration preparing the country for a prolonged drought, or is it also creating an opportunity to distribute politically valuable government assistance before the 2028 presidential elections?

That question deserves an answer before the money is spent.

A disaster the government knows is coming

The approaching crisis is hardly unexpected.

The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) reported on October 7 that a strong to very strong El Niño was present in the tropical Pacific and could continue through the first half of 2027. The phenomenon increases the likelihood of below-normal rainfall, prolonged dry spells and drought, although some areas may still experience heavy rainfall during tropical cyclones (PAGASA 2026).

The government’s own warnings identify threats to agricultural production, water availability, electricity generation and public health (Presidential Communications Office 2026).

The consequences are already becoming apparent.

According to the Office of Civil Defense, agricultural losses associated with El Niño had reached approximately ₱6.87 billion by October, affecting roughly 223,000 farmers and fisherfolk (Philippine News Agency 2026).

The Department of Agriculture has responded with its ₱61.99-billion consolidated plan, including ₱6.2 billion already released under the UPLIFT program. Another ₱371 million in proposed interventions remains unfunded (Department of Agriculture 2026).

The government is also proposing a ₱45.67-billion National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund for 2027, covering El Niño and other disasters. This is not an exclusively drought-related allocation, but it demonstrates the magnitude of public resources available for disaster preparedness and response (Department of Budget and Management 2026).

These are enormous sums for a country confronting fiscal pressures, infrastructure deficiencies and persistent poverty.

The question is whether they will purchase resilience or merely temporary relief.

The political convenience of ayuda

Consider the proposed ₱10 billion for Presidential Assistance to Farmers and Fisherfolk in 2027.

Agriculture Secretary Francisco Tiu Laurel Jr. has explained that the allocation is intended to help farmers and fisherfolk affected by El Niño. The House of Representatives has also confirmed the additional allocation in its proposed 2027 budget (Philippine Information Agency 2026; House of Representatives 2026).

The assistance may be necessary. Farmers whose crops have failed and families whose livelihoods have disappeared cannot wait for infrastructure projects to be completed.

But the timing deserves scrutiny.

The year 2027 immediately precedes the 2028 presidential elections. Billions of pesos in assistance could be distributed to households and agricultural communities during a politically sensitive period.

Unlike an irrigation canal or a desalination facility, cash assistance is highly visible to its recipients. It can be distributed at public ceremonies, accompanied by political personalities and advertised as evidence of a politician’s generosity.

That is the danger of an ayuda-centered political economy.

Public funds can be transformed, at least in the public imagination, into personal favors from politicians.

The concern is not that emergency assistance is inherently corrupt. Nor does the existence of a presidential assistance program establish that the administration intends to manipulate the 2028 elections.

The concern is that large discretionary assistance programs can create opportunities for patronage, selective beneficiary identification, political branding and abuse unless strong safeguards are imposed.

The potential for corruption extends beyond cash transfers. Emergency procurement, infrastructure contracts, transportation services, agricultural inputs and rehabilitation projects can also become vulnerable to overpricing, favoritism and irregular awards.

These risks require investigation and safeguards, not unsupported accusations against particular officials.

Yet the political incentives are difficult to ignore.

An irrigation system may serve farmers for decades, but its benefits are often taken for granted. A cash envelope handed out shortly before an election may generate immediate political gratitude.

This is the fundamental weakness of disaster politics: Government can become more politically rewarded for distributing relief than for eliminating the conditions that make relief necessary.

And when the next drought arrives, the same communities may find themselves lining up for assistance once again.

Why are we preparing buckets when we are surrounded by the sea?

There is another way to examine the coming crisis.

The Philippines is an archipelago of more than 7,600 islands, surrounded by seawater. Yet many of its communities remain dangerously dependent on rainfall, groundwater and increasingly stressed freshwater systems.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, the country’s freshwater withdrawals reached 101.61 billion cubic meters in 2025, up from 93.08 billion cubic meters in 2024. The country’s water-stress indicator reached 31.1 percent (Philippine Statistics Authority 2026).

Converted into liters, that represents approximately 278.4 billion liters of freshwater withdrawn daily, or approximately 50.1 trillion liters over an 180-day period at the 2025 average rate.

These figures include agricultural, industrial, and service-sector withdrawals. They do not represent household drinking-water demand, nor do they indicate how much water El Niño will actually remove from available supplies.

But they illustrate the magnitude of the country’s dependence on freshwater resources.

The question is whether the government can develop alternative sources before drought disrupts those supplies.

One answer is already available: seawater desalination.

Modern reverse-osmosis technology can transform seawater into freshwater suitable for household consumption. Portable and containerized plants can serve coastal barangays, island communities and emergency evacuation centers.

This is not speculative technology.

In fact, the Philippine government is already beginning to procure it.

The Office of Civil Defense announced it had initiated the procurement of pumps and desalination systems to support potable water and irrigation requirements (Philippine News Agency 2026).

More strikingly, Cebu’s provincial government is planning to acquire two portable, solar-powered desalination machines at an estimated ₱8 million each, alongside additional water tankers (Pedroza 2026).

Cebu’s initiative deserves national attention because it challenges the assumption that water shortages must be addressed primarily through water deliveries and emergency relief.

If a provincial government can consider purchasing desalination equipment, why should the national government not establish a coordinated program for communities most vulnerable to drought?

What could ₱3.24 billion accomplish?

Consider a hypothetical investment.

Suppose the government acquired 270 modular desalination plants, each rated to produce 100,000 liters of freshwater daily.

At an assumed operating utilization of 80 percent, these facilities could collectively produce approximately 21.6 million liters every day.

Over six months, that would amount to approximately 3.89 billion liters of freshwater.

At an emergency allowance of five liters per person daily, enough for drinking and basic cooking but not full household needs, this could theoretically support approximately 4.3 million people.

If each installed plant is assumed to cost ₱12 million, the initial capital expenditure would amount to ₱3.24 billion.

That represents only about 5.2 percent of the DA’s proposed ₱61.99-billion El Niño action plan.

The ₱12-million figure is a planning assumption, not a verified procurement quotation. The estimate excludes electricity, seawater intake, storage, distribution, maintenance, environmental compliance and operating costs. The actual number of plants needed would depend on geographically verified shortages and their capacities.

Still, the comparison raises an important public-policy question.

If the government can contemplate spending tens of billions of pesos on drought-related interventions, should it not also consider whether several billion pesos could establish water-production facilities that continue to serve communities long after the current El Niño episode ends?

Unlike temporary relief, durable infrastructure can create benefits extending beyond the next election cycle.

But what about agriculture?

Agriculture presents a much greater challenge.

A rice field requires substantially more water than a household needs for drinking. Producing enough desalinated seawater for conventional rice irrigation could prove prohibitively expensive.

A Philippine techno-economic study of solar-driven membrane desalination found that high capital costs and limited production efficiency could undermine the financial viability of particular installations (2023).

Desalination is therefore not a substitute for rehabilitating irrigation systems, constructing reservoirs, harvesting rainwater or improving agricultural water efficiency.

It may, however, provide a valuable supplementary source for high-value crops, protected farming systems and coastal agricultural communities where conventional freshwater supplies are unavailable.

This is precisely why the government should commission independent technical and economic assessments rather than indiscriminately purchase equipment.

A national program must determine which communities need drinking water, which agricultural areas can economically use desalinated water, and where other interventions would deliver better results.

Responsible investment requires engineering, not political theater.

The real danger is institutionalized dependency

The Marcos administration deserves recognition for pursuing infrastructure-oriented measures, including the procurement of solar irrigation and desalination systems.

But these initiatives must become part of a measurable national water-security strategy rather than remain scattered emergency projects.

The Department of Budget and Management has emphasized that disaster funds can finance preparedness, mitigation and capital expenditures—not merely post-disaster relief (Department of Budget and Management 2026).

That legal and fiscal flexibility is important.

It means the government need not wait until communities run out of water before investing in systems that could prevent shortages.

What remains uncertain is how much of the overall El Niño response will ultimately go toward direct assistance and how much toward durable water infrastructure.

That distinction should be publicly disclosed.

Congress should require the administration to publish detailed expenditure plans, including the amounts devoted to cash assistance, agricultural subsidies, irrigation rehabilitation, desalination, water storage and distribution systems.

Beneficiary-selection procedures should be independently auditable. Procurement contracts should be publicly accessible. Elected officials should not be permitted to convert taxpayer-funded disaster assistance into personal political advertisements.

The Commission on Audit, congressional oversight committees and civil society organizations should scrutinize these programs before, during and after implementation.

And the government should measure success not merely by how many families receive assistance, but by how many communities become less vulnerable to the next drought.

Because there is a fundamental difference between helping people survive a crisis and ensuring they will not face the same crisis again.

Water security, not political security

The approaching El Niño is more than a climate emergency. It is a test of the Marcos administration’s development priorities.

Will the government use billions of pesos to build the water infrastructure that Filipino communities desperately need?

Or will short-term assistance continue to dominate the political imagination because distributing public money offers more immediate political rewards than constructing infrastructure?

These questions become especially urgent with the 2028 presidential elections approaching.

The country should not presume corruption merely because substantial funds are being allocated before an election. But neither should Filipinos accept the distribution of billions in public assistance without demanding transparency, accountability and measurable long-term results.

The Philippines needs emergency relief. It also needs irrigation rehabilitation, water recycling, storage infrastructure, groundwater protection and carefully targeted desalination facilities.

These investments are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

The tragedy would be to spend billions responding to this El Niño, only to discover during the next one that the country remains just as vulnerable.

A government that distributes water during a drought provides temporary relief.

A government that establishes reliable water systems protects communities for generations.

The first may win applause. The second builds a nation.

As 2028 approaches, Filipinos should demand something more valuable than another round of ayuda: a country where fewer people must depend on politicians for their next bucket of water.

References:

Department of Agriculture. 2026. “DA Pitches P61.99B El Niño Action Plan as Malacañang Orders Targeted Aid, Market Watch.” October 19. Department of Agriculture.

Department of Budget and Management. 2026. “Bago Pa Dumating ang Sakuna: P45.67-B Disaster Fund Proposed for 2027 as Gov’t Prepares for El Niño, Other Calamities.” Department of Budget and Management.

House of Representatives. 2026. “House Boosts Farm, Fisheries Support in 2027 Budget for El Niño Preparations.” October 13. House of Representatives.

PAGASA. 2026. “Monthly Agroclimatic Review and Outlook.” October 7 El Niño advisory. PAGASA.

Pedroza, Carmel. 2026. “Cebu Prepares for El Niño.” BusinessMirror, October 15. BusinessMirror.

Philippine Information Agency. 2026. “DA Implements Php6.2-B UPLIFT Fund for Farmers, Fisherfolk amid El Niño Response.” Philippine Information Agency.

Philippine News Agency. 2026. “Gov’t Sets Aside P7.86-B Disaster Fund for El Niño Response.” Philippine News Agency.

Philippine Statistics Authority. 2026. “Country’s Water Use Efficiency Declined to PhP 221.48 per Cubic Meter in 2025.” September 3. Philippine Statistics Authority.

Presidential Communications Office. 2026. “Government Braces for ‘Very Strong’ El Niño, Urges Public to Prepare.” Presidential Communications Office.

“Techno-Economic Analysis on the Production of Domestic Water Using Solar-Driven Membrane Seawater Desalination Device in the Philippines.” 2023. Energy Reports. Read study.