When defense lawyers in an impeachment proceeding move early to attack the credibility of a key witness, the tactic is neither novel nor unexpected. What is revealing, however, is when and how it is deployed. In this case, the aggressive attempt to discredit a witness—before any formal trial—signals that the real battlefield is not legal, but political.

Legal scholars have long argued that impeachment proceedings are as much political as they are juridical (Sunstein 2017; Tribe and Matz 2018). Yet even within this hybrid space, sequencing matters. Credibility attacks are typically reserved for trial, where evidentiary standards and adversarial testing are formalized. Their premature use suggests an alternative objective: narrative control. The goal is not to undermine the probative value of testimony in court but to neutralize its impact on public opinion.

This contradiction becomes sharper when placed alongside the defense’s claim that the proceedings are unconstitutional for resembling a “trial.” If that were genuinely the case, then engaging in trial-like tactics undermines their own argument. What this reveals is strategic duality: delegitimize the process publicly while simultaneously preparing for its political consequences.

At the center of this unfolding drama is Madriaga’s testimony. If substantiated, it does not merely implicate individuals—it sketches the outline of a political formation that operates less like a conventional democratic network and more like a coordinated patronage machine with coercive features. In its most troubling interpretation, it points to what scholars of comparative politics would recognize as mafia-style governance: a system in which political authority is intertwined with personal loyalty, control of resources, and the protection of elite interests, sometimes through illicit means (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2011).

This is not a casual accusation. The concept of a “political mafia” is analytically precise. Diego Gambetta (1993) defines the mafia as an organization that provides protection in contexts where trust in formal institutions is weak. Federico Varese (2011) extends this framework to political systems where networks of loyalty substitute for rule-based governance. When applied to contemporary populist regimes, this lens helps explain the fusion of state resources, personal networks, and informal coercion.

The Philippines, like many democracies with weak institutional enforcement, has long been vulnerable to such formations (Sidel 1999). What distinguishes the Duterte-aligned bloc is its coupling of this patronage architecture with populist rhetoric—what Cas Mudde (2004) describes as a “thin-centered ideology” that pits a morally pure “people” against a corrupt elite, while often masking elite consolidation beneath anti-establishment language.

Seen in this light, the current impeachment proceedings are not merely about legal accountability; they expose a governing logic. The early discrediting of Madriaga is therefore not incidental—it is essential. If his claims gain traction, they threaten not only individual reputations but also the coherence of the Duterte political narrative itself.

This helps explain the urgency of recent mobilizations, such as the gathering of pro-Duterte groups at Club Filipino. Far from a mere show of strength, such events resemble what political scientists call loyalty-consolidation exercises within populist movements under stress (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). These are moments not only of outward signaling but also of inward reckoning: who remains loyal, who has defected, and who can still be mobilized.

Rightist-populist cliques, particularly those organized around charismatic authority, tend to respond to institutional threats with a predictable set of tactics. They intensify identity-based appeals, cast legal scrutiny as persecution, and close ranks around core figures (Müller 2016). Crucially, they also blur the line between public office and personal networks, reinforcing the perception that political survival is synonymous with group survival.

The emerging attempt to position alternative figures within the Duterte orbit—most notably Sebastian “Baste” Duterte—fits squarely within this pattern. Dynastic substitution becomes a mechanism of continuity, allowing the network to preserve itself even as individual actors face risk. Yet this strategy rests on a questionable assumption: that electoral legitimacy can be inherited rather than earned.

Such assumptions underestimate a shifting electorate. While populist anger remains a potent force, it is not infinitely transferable. Voters may tolerate strongman rhetoric, but they are not bound to political brands that no longer deliver stability or credibility indefinitely.

What makes this moment dangerous is not merely the persistence of populist politics, but its potential mutation. When populist movements begin to resemble closed, loyalty-driven networks that prioritize self-preservation over institutional integrity, they cease to function as corrective forces within democracy. Instead, they become extractive systems—structures that use the people’s language while operating to protect a few.

If Madriaga’s testimony is borne out, then what is at stake is not just the fate of a vice presidency, but a broader reckoning with how power has been organized, exercised, and shielded. The impeachment process, for all its imperfections, is a rare opportunity for exposure.

And that is precisely why the response has been so swift, so aggressive, and so revealing.

Because when a political machine begins to look like a mafia, its first instinct is not to defend the truth—but to destroy the witness.

References:

Gambetta, Diego. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Harvard University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die. Crown.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition 39(4): 541–563.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sidel, John T. 1999. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford University Press.

Sunstein, Cass R. 2017. Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide. Harvard University Press.

Tribe, Laurence H., and Joshua Matz. 2018. To End a Presidency: The Power of Impeachment. Basic Books.

Varese, Federico. 2011. Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territories. Princeton University Press.