The revival of Neo-American imperialism under Donald Trump is often framed as a global story—a recalibration of American power, a reassertion of U.S. primacy in an increasingly unstable world. But for smaller states like the Philippines, the danger is not abstract or distant. It is intimate, structural, and profoundly destabilizing. Neo-Americana does not merely reorder relations between great powers; it reconfigures domestic political competition in weaker states by turning sovereignty into a bargaining chip and elite rivalry into an entry point for external intervention.

At the heart of this threat lies a convergence of two doctrines: Neo-American imperialism, which asserts the United States’ right to shape global outcomes unilaterally, and sovereign exceptionalism, which holds that the United States may selectively obey—or disregard—international law when its interests demand it. Together, they create an international environment in which domestic legitimacy matters less than external utility, and where political survival increasingly depends on securing favor from Washington rather than consent from one’s own people.

For a country like the Philippines—resource-rich, strategically located, and internally divided among competing elite factions—this environment is especially perilous.

Neo-American Imperialism as Transactional Power

Neo-American imperialism should not be mistaken for a return to Cold War ideology or liberal internationalism. It is not animated primarily by the export of democracy or the defense of a rules-based order. Instead, it is transactional, grounded in the belief that American power exists to deliver tangible economic and strategic returns to the United States itself.

This logic aligns closely with neoclassical realism, which holds that foreign policy is shaped not only by the distribution of power in the international system but also by domestic economic imperatives and elite preferences (Rose 1998). Under Trump, foreign policy is explicitly tied to economic performance: interventions stabilize markets, coercion disciplines rivals, and assertiveness reassures investors that the United States remains capable of enforcing favorable outcomes.

Several months into Trump’s renewed interventionist posture, the U.S. economy has indeed shown improvement—buoyed by stabilized energy markets, heightened investor confidence, and the perception that Washington is once again willing to use force and economic leverage to secure supply chains and strategic advantage. This is not incidental. It is central to the logic of Neo-Americana.

In this framework, foreign states are not partners in a shared international project. They are assets, liabilities, or leverage points.

Sovereign Exceptionalism and the Collapse of Legal Constraint

If Neo-American imperialism describes the ambition, sovereign exceptionalism provides the legal and moral rationale. Sovereign exceptionalism is the doctrine that international law applies universally in theory but asymmetrically in practice. The United States recognizes the existence of sovereignty and legal norms while reserving the right to suspend or reinterpret them when compliance would constrain American action.

Stephen Krasner famously described sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy”—a principle invoked selectively by powerful states (Krasner 1999). What distinguishes the current moment is that this hypocrisy is no longer concealed. Trump’s foreign policy dispenses with multilateral justification and institutional mediation, asserting instead that capability confers legitimacy.

This matters profoundly for smaller states. When the most powerful country in the world demonstrates that sovereignty can be overridden unilaterally, it signals to domestic elites everywhere that external backing can trump internal legitimacy.

The Philippines: Strategic Value, Structural Vulnerability

The Philippines is uniquely exposed to this logic. Its strategic location along critical Indo-Pacific sea lanes, its proximity to regional flashpoints, and its abundance of natural resources—particularly minerals vital to modern industries—make it geopolitically valuable. From the standpoint of Neo-Americana, it is precisely the kind of country whose alignment must be secured.

Yet value also invites vulnerability.

Dependency theory has long warned that peripheral states integrated into global systems on unequal terms are susceptible to external influence exercised through domestic elites rather than direct force (Frank 1979). Power penetrates not through invasion, but through contracts, alliances, and elite bargains.

The Philippine political system, characterized by strong families, factional competition, and weakly institutionalized parties, provides fertile ground for this dynamic. Intra-elite competition is not a pathology—it is a defining feature. Under conditions of sovereign exceptionalism, it becomes a strategic opening.

Intra-Elite Competition as an Instrument of External Influence

Elite theory offers a useful lens here. Vilfredo Pareto and later C. Wright Mills argued that politics in many societies is driven less by mass participation than by competition among elite groups for control of state resources (Mills 1956). When elites are divided, external actors gain leverage—not by imposing outcomes directly, but by selecting which faction to empower.

Neo-American imperialism thrives in such environments.

Any Philippine elite clique—whether aligned with the opposition or the incumbent administration—can plausibly seek American backing by offering tangible concessions: expanded military access, preferential investment terms, resource extraction rights, or diplomatic alignment against regional rivals. The metric is not democratic mandate or constitutional continuity. It is strategic usefulness.

This transforms domestic political competition into a form of international auction, where rival elites bid for external sponsorship.

Sovereignty as a Negotiable Asset

Under these conditions, sovereignty ceases to function as an absolute principle. It becomes fungible.

International relations theorists have long recognized that sovereignty is not evenly distributed in practice. What Neo-Americana does is normalize this inequality. It makes explicit what realism has always implied: that weaker states enjoy autonomy only so long as their choices do not conflict with the interests of stronger ones (Waltz 1979).

For the Philippines, this means that maintaining a pro-U.S. orientation is no longer sufficient. Alignment must be continually optimized. A government that is friendly but insufficiently compliant—or insufficiently valuable—can be quietly sidelined in favor of an alternative elite faction offering better terms.

The decision need not involve overt intervention. It can unfold through economic pressure, diplomatic signaling, or selective engagement. Crucially, it can rest on the personal preferences of the American president, rather than institutionalized policy commitments.
This is alliance politics stripped of predictability.

Realism Without Restraint

From a realist standpoint, none of this violates the logic of international politics. John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism predicts that great powers will exploit opportunities to expand influence whenever the balance of power allows it (Mearsheimer 2001). What is new is the erosion of restraint mechanisms that once moderated this behavior.

During the post–Cold War period, U.S. power was often exercised through institutions, norms, and coalition-building. These mechanisms did not eliminate power asymmetry, but they obscured it. Neo-American imperialism abandons that pretense. Power is asserted directly, and legality follows rather than constrains action.

For smaller states, the result is a harsher environment in which predictability disappears. Rules exist, but they are conditional. Commitments hold, but only until a better deal emerges.

The Democratic Cost

The most profound consequence of this system is its corrosive effect on democracy.

When domestic elites understand that external endorsement matters more than electoral legitimacy, democratic institutions hollow out. Elections continue, but they no longer function as decisive mechanisms of accountability. Real power shifts to informal negotiations conducted beyond public scrutiny.

Political scientists describe this condition as competitive oligarchy: a system in which elites compete for power, but the public plays only a marginal role. Neo-American imperialism accelerates this outcome by rewarding elites who can best translate domestic control into external leverage.

The Philippines has seen versions of this dynamic before. What changes under sovereign exceptionalism is the explicitness of the incentive. External power is no longer constrained by normative commitments to democracy. It is guided by returns.

Why This Moment Is Uniquely Dangerous

What makes the current revival of Neo-Americana especially threatening is not simply American power, but American discretion. Decisions about support, pressure, or intervention are centralized, personalized, and detached from institutional guardrails.

This creates an environment in which:

Domestic instability becomes strategically useful
Elite defection is rewarded
Sovereignty is conditional on utility

In such a system, smaller states are not invaded. They are reconfigured.

Conclusion: A Warning for the Philippines

The revival of Neo-American imperialism does not guarantee U.S. intervention in the Philippines. It does something more subtle and more dangerous: it reshapes the incentives that govern elite behavior.

It tells Philippine elites that, external power outweighs internal legitimacy, alignment is transactional and sovereignty is negotiable

In a world governed by sovereign exceptionalism, the greatest risk is not opposing the United States—but being replaceable in its calculations.

This is not the restoration of international order. It is the monetization of influence. For smaller states navigating internal divisions, it poses a fundamental question: who truly decides the state’s future—the people, or the power they cannot vote against?

References:

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1979. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51 (1): 144–172.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.