PH can now export canned pineapples to Australia without duties

on

Australia decided to lift its anti-dumping measure on Philippine canned pineapples, 15 years after it was first imposed.

This means that, under the Asean-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), the Philippines can now export canned pineapples duty-free to Australia once the measure expires on Oct. 17, 2021 for consumer canned pineapples, and on Nov. 13, 2021 for Food Service Industrial (FSI) canned pineapples.

Agriculture Secretary William Dar welcomed the favorable development, noting that the lifting of the anti-dumping measure will further strengthen trading relationship with Australia.

“Our trading relationship with Australia has been a healthy one, except for this kind of impediment that had blocked the entry of Philippine agriculture exports to that country,” Dar said.

“This is a most propitious opportunity for the Philippine pineapple sector, given its dramatic growth performance this past of couple of years,” he added.

Pineapple is the next fruit, following banana, that could capture a big slice of the export market given the country’s comparative advantage in producing said commodity.

The Australian government first imposed the anti-dumping measure in 2006 for a period of five years after Golden Circle Limited, the sole producer of canned pineapples in Australia, lodged an application with its government requesting for the imposition of the said measure on canned pineapples imported from the Philippines.

The measure was extended for another five years in 2011, and subsequently for another five years in 2016.

In its two reports issued on Oct. 6, 2021, Australia’s Anti-Dumping Commission (ADC) decided to discontinue the said measure on canned pineapples from the Philippines, following findings that its expiration will neither lead to the dumping of the products concerned nor cause material injury to the domestic industry.

The ADC initiated an expiry review on Jan. 25, 2021, after Golden Circle sought the extension of the imposition of the anti-dumping measure for another five years.


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