Duterte yet to make ‘new quarantine responses’

on

President Rodrigo Duterte has not yet made a decision on government’s
“new quarantine responses”, including possible granular lockdowns in
Metro Manila, Malacañang said on Sunday.

This, after Trade Secretary Ramon Lopez said on Saturday the
Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious
Diseases (IATF-EID) approved the implementation of granular lockdowns
starting Sept. 8.

“New quarantine responses still for approval of PPRD. FYI,”
Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque said in a statement.

The IATF-EID recommends quarantine responses but Duterte makes the final say.

Under granular or localized lockdowns, only health workers could leave
their homes. Authorized persons outside residence (APORs) will also be
prohibited from leaving their homes.

Some businesses will be able to operate but will be scaled down
depending on the specified level.

Currently, Metro Manila and other areas in the country is under
modified enhanced community quarantine (MECQ), the second strictest
community quarantine status, extended until Sept. 7 to address the
increasing bed occupancy and enable the local government units to ramp
up their vaccination rollout.

The nearby provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal are also under MECQ.

The MECQ status is also being implemented in the provinces of Ilocos
Norte, Apayao, Bataan, Aklan, Iloilo, and the cities of Lucena,
Lapu-Lapu, Cebu, Mandaue, and Cagayan de Oro.

General community quarantine (GCQ) status “with heightened
restrictions” is retained in Ilocos Sur, Cagayan, Quezon, Batangas,
Naga City, Antique, Bacolod City, and Capiz.

Cebu province, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Sur, Misamis Oriental,
Davao City, Davao del Norte, Davao Occidental, Davao de Oro, and
Butuan City is under the more restrictive GCQ.

The GCQ classification without restrictions is being implemented anew
in Baguio City, Santiago City, Quirino, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya,
Tarlac, Puerto Princesa, Guimaras, Negros Occidental, Zamboanga
Sibugay, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao
del Sur, General Santos City, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, North
Cotabato, and South Cotabato.

Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur,
Dinagat Islands, and Cotabato City is also under the regular GCQ.

Earlier, Interior Undersecretary Jonathan Malaya announced the
consensus among the different government agencies to resort to the
implementation of granular lockdown which could be limited to a
building, street, or barangay.

As of Saturday, the country logged 20,741 new Covid-19 cases bringing
the total up to 2.061 million.

Recoveries climbed to 1.869 million after 21,962 more people got well
while the death toll reached 34,062 with 189 new deaths.


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