China hikes defense spending by 6.8% to $210 billion

on

China is increasing its defense spending by 6.8 percent in 2021 as it works to maintain a robust upgrading of the armed forces despite high government debt and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

A national budget report issued Friday said China would spend 1.355 trillion yuan ($210 billion) on defense in the coming year.

That’s up from 1.3 trillion yuan ($180 billion) last year representing a 6.6-percent boost, the lowest percentage increase in at least two decades.

The military budget has dipped during periods of slower economic growth, but has also been dropping steadily from the double-digit percentage increases over years as the increasingly powerful military matures and rapid expansion of what is already the world’s second largest defense budget is no longer required.

The lavish spending increases of years past have given China the second-largest defense budget in the world behind the US. With 3 million troops, the world’s largest standing military has been steadily adding aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines and stealth fighters to its arsenal.

The government says most of the spending increases go toward improving pay and other conditions for troops while observers say the budget omits much of China’s spending on weaponry, most of it developed domestically. China’s military is largely designed to maintain its threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its control, although it has also grown more assertive in the South China Sea, the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and elsewhere.

The US, whose defense spending is estimated to run to about $934 billion between Oct. 1, 2020, and Sept. 30, 2021, has complained of a lack of transparency in China’s defense programs, fueling speculation that Beijing aims to supplant America as the primary military power in East Asia.

The People’s Liberation Army exercises a strong political role as the military branch of the ruling Communist Party. President and party leader Xi Jinping heads the government and party commissions that oversee the armed forces.

In his address to Friday’s opening session of the ceremonial legislature, the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang said the government would “thoroughly implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening the armed forces and the military strategy for the new era, (and) ensure the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces.”

“We will boost military training and preparedness across the board, make overall plans for responding to security risks in all areas and for all situations, and enhance the military’s strategic capacity to protect the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country” Li said.


Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

LEAVE A REPLY

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

MUST READ

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER!

MAS PINABILIS NA ANG PAGBIYAHE SA VICTORY LINER! Mas madali at mas convenient na ang pagkuha ng bus tickets! Alamin kung paano gagawing mas mabilis at...

MC Taxi Riders Appeal to LTFRB amidst Overboarding Issue

MANILA, Philippines, October 22, 2026 — Motorcycle taxi riders are calling on the Marcos administration and transport regulatory bodies to provide those operating beyond...

China’s Wolf Warriors are Back. Beijing Should Recall Its...

China's ambassador to the Philippines has accomplished in a few sentences what years of Chinese public diplomacy have struggled to prevent: He has reinforced the perception that Beijing regards its smaller neighbors not as sovereign equals, but as countries expected to accommodate its growing military and economic power.

Beyond the 2027 Invasion Timeline: Diplomatic Isolation, Ontological Security,...

This paper challenges military-centered assessments of a possible People's Republic of China (PRC) operation against Taiwan by 2027, arguing that Beijing's calculations may depend not only on military readiness and economic costs but also on diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy, and political identity. It advances a conditional framework integrating ontological security theory, the Chinese sociological concept of mianzi (face), and recognition politics. The paper proposes that Taiwan's declining diplomatic recognition could strengthen Beijing's sovereignty narrative, create a perceived loss of face for Taiwan's governing authorities, and alter the political conditions under which Beijing considers coercive or military unification. Drawing on official PRC statements, U.S. security assessments, and international relations scholarship, the analysis develops three propositions concerning recognition, status vulnerability, and coercive decision-making. It argues that complete diplomatic isolation could represent a significant political threshold without necessarily eliminating Taiwan's international relationships or legitimizing the use of force. The paper contributes to cross-strait security studies by identifying diplomatic recognition as a potentially important condition that shapes Beijing's assessment of the political feasibility and costs of unification, beyond conventional materialist explanations.

El Niño, Ayuda and the Politics of Disaster: Are...

The Marcos administration is preparing billions of pesos in drought-related spending. But will that money build permanent water security, or deepen a political culture in which disaster relief becomes a source of electoral patronage?

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading

Discover more from Current Ph

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading