As the world watches the possibility of a widening war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, attention is focused on oil markets, shipping lanes, and great-power deterrence. But thousands of miles away, in the southern Philippines, another fragile front could quietly fracture.

In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), the painstaking normalization process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) remains incomplete. The 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro ended decades of armed conflict. Yet peace is not a single signature — it is an ongoing choreography of weapons turnover, decommissioning, policing reforms, and socio-economic reintegration.

A major regional war would not automatically collapse this process. But academic research and monitoring reports suggest it could pause, distort, or even reverse key gains — unless Manila and its partners move swiftly to insulate peace from geopolitical shock.

The fragility of incremental gains

Recent monitoring by the Peace Accords Matrix–Mindanao (PAM-M) shows that normalization in BARMM has advanced in careful, incremental stages.¹ Weapon turnover events — such as the November 2025 decommissioning in Upi, Maguindanao del Norte, supported by the UNDP Philippines — signal commitment but also reveal how dependent progress is on sustained logistics, verification, and political will.²

The Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs), composed of government forces and former MILF combatants, are central to maintaining localized stability. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity has repeatedly emphasized this joint mechanism as a pillar of confidence-building.³ In September 2025, Presidential Peace Adviser Carlito G. Galvez Jr. reiterated Manila’s commitment to normalization even amid broader security pressures.⁴

But history shows that peace processes are particularly vulnerable to external shocks.

Stephen John Stedman’s seminal work on “spoilers” argues that sudden crises create openings for actors — internal or external — to undermine fragile settlements.⁵ When the security environment hardens, moderates become cautious, hardliners gain rhetorical ground, and monitoring mechanisms strain under redirected resources.

A U.S.–Israel–Iran war could produce precisely that environment.

Immediate tremors: security, funding, and rhetoric

In the first days and months of a regional escalation, Philippine security agencies would likely reprioritize surveillance, logistics, and readiness toward external contingencies. This shift could reduce manpower and transport support for JPST operations and Joint Normalization Committee tasks — slowing weapon collection, verification, and community policing.

Normalization is highly visible. Delays are politically meaningful. If deadlines slip or verification weakens, trust erodes.

International partners also matter. Donors and multilateral actors supporting decommissioning and livelihood programs — including UN agencies and monitoring bodies — may redirect staff and funding toward humanitarian crises in the Middle East. Neutral third-party presence often deters spoilers; its absence creates perception gaps.

Economic tremors could compound the problem. Analysts have warned that instability in the Middle East could affect remittances and inflation.⁶ Many overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) are deployed in the Gulf. If conflict disrupts employment or triggers repatriation, remittance-dependent communities — including parts of Mindanao — could face sudden strain. For former combatants still transitioning to civilian livelihoods, such shocks increase vulnerability to local unrest or criminal recruitment.

Meanwhile, national political discourse may shift toward “security-first” narratives.

Research published by Oxford University Press and related scholarship shows that external threats heighten public sensitivity to out-group risks, empowering leaders who advocate tougher postures. In that climate, pursuing sensitive normalization steps — such as final decommissioning schedules or integration of former fighters into security institutions — becomes politically costly.

The longer shadow: militarization and stalled reintegration

If conflict persists for months or years, the structural effects deepen.

The International Crisis Group’s 2025 report on Philippine military modernization highlights how regional security dynamics can drive defense expansion.⁷ Increased defense budgets, while understandable, risk crowding out social investments in education, livelihoods and local governance — the very pillars that sustain post-conflict stabilization in BARMM.

Monitoring data from PAM-M underscores how incremental and shock-sensitive implementation has been.¹ Delays in decommissioning or integration leave significant numbers of former combatants in limbo — semi-armed, undercompensated, and uncertain. Evidence from comparative peace processes suggests most ex-combatants remain committed to negotiated settlements, but splinter factions can emerge when reintegration stalls.

Political incentives also shift. Protracted regional insecurity narrows bargaining space. Elites benefiting from centralized security contracts or patronage networks may resist deeper transfers of autonomy to Bangsamoro institutions. The peace track risks entanglement in national electoral contests.

None of this makes relapse inevitable. But it raises the cost of inaction.

A possible upside — if cooperation is visible

Not all crises erode peace. They can also consolidate it.

If Manila and the MILF coordinate visibly on humanitarian preparedness, community security, and stabilization — through sustained JPST patrols, transparent weapons management, and joint public messaging — the crisis could deepen mutual reliance.

MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim has repeatedly emphasized in public addresses the movement’s commitment to normalization and governance responsibilities.⁸ Statements from the peace adviser echo that stance.⁴ A jointly articulated crisis-response roadmap — detailing how normalization will continue despite external shocks — could preempt rumor and politicization.

Stedman’s framework for spoiler management underscores the importance of inducement, socialization, and coalition-building in protecting agreements under stress.⁵ International guarantors can reinforce sensitive steps such as final decommissioning or force integration, ensuring both sides perceive credible enforcement.

Crisis-proofing peace

If policymakers want to prevent a distant war from destabilizing Mindanao, several priorities emerge:

• Ring-fence normalization funding. Donor commitments to PAM-M monitoring, JPST logistics, and decommissioning support must be insulated from crisis reallocation.¹
• Maintain neutral verification. Continued involvement of actors such as UNDP in weapons management helps deter mistrust.²
• Protect remittance-dependent households. Targeted safety nets can prevent economic desperation from translating into insecurity.⁶
• Sustain joint communications. Visible GPH-MILF messaging reduces elite politicization and rumor cascades.³⁴

The outcome ultimately depends on variables beyond Mindanao: the duration of Middle East hostilities, Philippine domestic budgeting decisions, and cohesion within MILF leadership. But the lesson from comparative peace processes is clear: shocks do not automatically destroy agreements. They test whether institutions built in calmer times can withstand turbulence.

Peace in BARMM was hard-won. Allowing it to drift because of a distant war would be a strategic failure — not only for Mindanao, but for a region already navigating rising geopolitical tension.

In an era of cascading crises, crisis-proofing peace may be as vital as preparing for war.

Notes (Chicago-style in-text references):

1. M. Joshi et al., Peace Accords Matrix–Mindanao (PAM-M) and Civil Society Baseline Report on the State of Implementation of the Normalization Annex (Notre Dame/Kroc Institute, 2025).
2. UNDP Philippines, “Weapons turnover in Upi, Maguindanao del Norte,” press release, Nov. 13, 2025.
3. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, “GPH-MILF JPSC commit to advance normalization process,” Dec. 9, 2025.
4. Statement of Carlito G. Galvez Jr., Sept. 8, 2025.
5. Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” Belfer Center/International Security Program (1997).
6. “Middle East tensions may impact OFW remittances, inflation,” BusinessWorld, Apr. 26, 2024.
7. International Crisis Group, “Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ military modernisation effort and regional security dynamics,” Aug. 12, 2025.
8. Murad Ebrahim, public addresses, Bangsamoro Multimedia Network/YouTube, 2025.