DoF: Equity, fixed-income markets shored up by local investors in Q1

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As of the first quarter of this year, the equity and fixed-income markets remained robust, with local retail investors accounting for 74.3 percent of stock market transactions.

 

This is according to the Department of Finance, citing a report by the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) to the Capital Market Development Council (CMDC).

 

The PSE reported that retail investors accounted for 43.3 percent of the amount traded by local investors, up from 18.2 percent in 2019 and 26.9 percent in 2020.

 

Investor-related trading accounted for 59 percent of the overall traded volume in the fixed-income industry over the same time span.

 

The increased involvement of institutional investors in both markets, according to Finance Secretary and CMDC Chairman Carlos Dominguez 3rd, demonstrates the public’s trust and confidence in the regulatory bodies in charge of safeguarding their capital and investment returns.

 

Despite a significant decrease in foreign participation in the stock market from 55.5 percent in 2019 to 45.4 percent in 2020, the average trading volume increased by 49.6 percent from 2020 to the first quarter of 2021, “indicating that local investors have stepped up,” PSE President Ramon Monzon, said.

 

The PSE’s year-to-date average daily value turnover was P11 billion as of the end of March 2021, bigger than th P7.35 billion in 2020 and P7.29 billion in 2019.

 

“Market liquidity is off to a good start.  Trading in the first quarter remains robust. We have almost a 50 percent  increase in value turnover. Retail investors are very active in the stock market at least in the first quarter of 2021,” Monzon was quoted as saying.

 

Philippine Dealing & Exchange Corp. President and Chief Executive Officer Antonino Nakpil, on the other hand, said the fixed-income or debt securities market performed slightly worse in the first quarter than the same period last year, but investor-related trading accounted for 59 percent of the total amount of P1.5 trillion, or P898 billion, as of end-March this year.

BY MEYNARD DELA CERNA

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