The detention of gambling figure Charlie “Atong” Ang over his alleged role in the prominent Sabungeros case, alongside ex-Congressman Zaldy Co who is linked to the 2 trillion peso flood control scandal, may have major legal and political effects. These situations test the Marcos Junior government and could shift negative public opinion while bolstering the private sector’s confidence in the government. Enforcing the law impartially and showing that the elite cannot manipulate the system and avoid accountability would likely foster a better economic and political climate.

Corruption is not merely misconduct; it is a function of expectations. When elites believe that political connections guarantee impunity, corruption becomes rational behavior rather than an aberration. Development, as Mancur Olson argued, depends on a state capable of restraining powerful “roving bandits,” including those embedded within the political system itself (Olson 1993).

From this perspective, the significance of the Ang and Co cases lies less in the specific allegations than in their symbolic reach. Both figures occupy positions where business interests, political access, and public resources intersect—precisely the zones where enforcement has historically been weakest.

Accountability and the credibility problem
Decades of research reveal that anti-corruption measures are effective not just because of laws but also because of credible enforcement. Susan Rose-Ackerman points out that selective or sporadic prosecutions usually don’t succeed because they don’t change public expectations; only steady, unbiased enforcement can modify behavior (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016).

High-profile arrests can therefore serve as signals. When previously untouchable figures face prosecution, the state signals that political insulation may no longer protect economic privilege. But the signal is fragile. If cases stall, collapse, or appear politically selective, the message reverses.

This dilemma is especially acute for democratic governments. Studies of political legitimacy show that citizens judge institutions not only by outcomes but also by procedural fairness—whether rules apply equally to the powerful and the weak (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). Enforcement that appears selective risks reinforcing cynicism rather than restoring trust.

The Marcos administration’s narrow window
For the Marcos Jr. administration, these cases present both opportunity and risk. Comparative evidence suggests that credible anti-corruption actions can temporarily raise public confidence in government (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). But research also shows that repeated corruption scandals without resolution can depress trust by revealing the depth of systemic abuse.

In summary, arrests alone are insufficient. Political gains are only achieved when prosecutions are handled by independent courts, lead to convictions when justified, and are accompanied by institutional reform. Without this, enforcement seems merely performative—punishment without real change.

Economic consequences beyond the courtroom
The economic stakes are high. Corruption in infrastructure, especially flood-control projects, leads to inflated budgets, poor construction, and inefficient investment, as studies show (Golden and Picci 2005; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).

In the short term, aggressive enforcement can slow economic activity. Investigations often delay projects and create uncertainty for contractors and investors, a pattern observed in other countries that launched major anti-corruption campaigns (Wedeman 2012). Markets tend to react cautiously to political disruption, even when the disruption is reform-driven.

Over the longer term, however, the evidence is clearer. Countries that reduce corruption tend to see improved public-spending efficiency, stronger investor confidence, and higher growth potential. The International Monetary Fund identifies governance reform as a key driver of durable economic performance (IMF 2019).

In flood control, returns are especially high. Clean procurement not only saves money but also reduces disaster risk, limits future fiscal liabilities, and protects economic activity in vulnerable regions.

Why enforcement must become reform
Political economists warn against conflating enforcement with structural change. North, Wallis, and Weingast describe many developing political systems as “limited-access orders,” in which elites exchange rents for stability (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). In such systems, removing individual actors without changing the rules often merely reshuffles rents rather than eliminates them.

The lasting relevance of the Ang and Co cases will therefore depend on whether they catalyze reforms in procurement oversight, auditing, and legislative accountability. Without these reforms, even successful prosecutions risk becoming isolated events.

A test with lasting implications
Moments like these are uncommon. When high-profile cases occur, they temporarily draw public attention to how power operates, opening the possibility of reform. Whether this window leads to convictions and meaningful institutional changes—or fades away into unresolved cases and public exhaustion—will shape how these arrests are remembered.
For the Marcos administration, consistently pursuing accountability could strengthen both political legitimacy and economic governance. Selective accountability risks confirming the public’s worst assumptions about power in the Philippines.

References:
Golden, Miriam, and Lucio Picci. 2005. “Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data.” Economics & Politics 17 (1): 37–75.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019. Fiscal Monitor: Curbing Corruption. Washington, DC.
Levi, Margaret, Audrey Sacks, and Tom R. Tyler. 2009. “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs.” American Behavioral Scientist 53 (3): 354–375.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567–576.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Bonnie J. Palifka. 2016. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2008. “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions.” Governance 21 (2): 165–190.
Tanzi, Vito, and Hamid Davoodi. 1997. “Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth.” IMF Working Paper 97/139.
Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.